Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
As the United States confronts new and ever evolving security threats with innovative and adaptive thinking, there is one security threat that has persisted for almost a quarter of a century and has been met with repetitive alarms and cyclical reactions: the North Korean nuclear threat. Almost a decade ago, U.S. relations with North Korea were on an upswing with the October 2000 Joint communiqué expressing mutual interest in achieving peace and security; North/South Korean relations were even significantly improved with the first inter-Korean summit in June of that year. The stark contrast with the current relations with North Korea demonstrates the fluctuating, but ever present task of confronting North Korea nuclear threats. Solutions over how best to deal with North Korea have ranged from military intervention, United Nations Security Council sanctions, bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations, to stick-and-carrot offerings. The dialogue over North Korea’s nuclear issue has reignited after each nuclear test or discovery and has often led to equating North Korean nuclear endeavors with the production of nuclear weapons.

Siegfried Hecker’s most recent visit to North Korea’s Yongbyon site in November 2010 reignited controversies over the country’s nuclear ambitions and nuclear weapons program. As one of the world’s most demonized countries, North Korea’s endeavors often occasion analysts’ worst-case scenarios and the international community’s stick-and-carrot treatment. Whether North Korea deserves this reputation is open to interpretation which will not be addressed in this paper. Perceptions regarding North Korea are problematic however, when they are derived from over-generalized assessments, intuitive leaps, and preconceived expectations. This paper seeks to articulate a more nuanced assessment of North Korea’s current nuclear program by highlighting how common and problematic intuitive leaps create obstacles for an accurate evaluation of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and can harm future negotiations. Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
Nellwyn Olson is currently a Master of Arts candidate in International Relations at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, where she is focusing on Global Security and East Asia foreign policy. Her research interests include identifying the illicit flow of nuclear materials in East Asia and the smuggling routes of drugs and weapons throughout Southeast Asia and Oceania. She graduated with a Bachelors in Business Administration from the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan where she studied corporate strategy, Southeast Asian area studies, and economics.