Note: This paper appeared in the electronic edition of the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
In 1962, there was a breakdown in diplomatic relations between India and China. The conflict that followed was regarded as embarrassing for the India political and military leaders, as they were caught completely off guard, and their intelligence infrastructure was non-existent. For the Indian strategists, this was such a humiliation that India sought to never allow itself to be so vulnerable again. Looking forward nine years, the Indian military infrastructure responded to a Pakistani preemptive strike intended to cripple the Indian Air Force, going on to win air superiority. Additionally, during the fighting itself, many parties involved and outside observers contend that the Indian intelligence network, especially the increasingly notorious Research and Analysis Wing, had armed and mobilized Bangladeshi resistance and enabled Indian forces to bypass Pakistani strong points and utterly dislodge the Pakistani position in what is now Bangladesh. The Sino-Indian War humiliated the Indian military complex, and the policy that evolved from this humiliation was one motivated by a desire to achieve never to be caught off-balance again. This quest for strategic invulnerability resulted in a change in Indian discourse about the subcontinent and the use of “offensive intelligence,” where organizations in India, especially the Research and Analysis Wing, took measures to actively forward their agendas beyond the Indian borders. After this, India’s agenda was no longer discussed in terms of Indian security, but rather regional security, and Indian leaders put forward ambitious plans to position India as a major world power and voice of the subcontinent.

Israeli diplomacy and military scholar Yaacov Vertzberger offers extensive commentary on the factors that led to the war between China and India. Nehru’s understanding of international law appears to have been idealistic. Specifically, he placed great weight on India’s position in Tibet being supported by international law, while China perceived the laws as being rooted in colonialism in the ways that they made specific reference to territory, and as such, only appealed to them when it served their position. Nehru, being a Western educated lawyer, placed faith in the rule and adherence of international law, and took Chinese concessions to the terms of the McMahon line to be tacit acceptance of Indian legitimacy, when in fact China merely saw the acceptance of these terms as part of the political game for which it would receive favor and consideration at a later time.
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