6th Volume (2011)

“Building a Strategic Culture: Indian Intelligence, Policy and Regional Security, 1962-1972” – Connor McNulty

Note: This paper appeared in the electronic edition of the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
In 1962, there was a breakdown in diplomatic relations between India and China. The conflict that followed was regarded as embarrassing for the India political and military leaders, as they were caught completely off guard, and their intelligence infrastructure was non-existent. For the Indian strategists, this was such a humiliation that India sought to never allow itself to be so vulnerable again. Looking forward nine years, the Indian military infrastructure responded to a Pakistani preemptive strike intended to cripple the Indian Air Force, going on to win air superiority. Additionally, during the fighting itself, many parties involved and outside observers contend that the Indian intelligence network, especially the increasingly notorious Research and Analysis Wing, had armed and mobilized Bangladeshi resistance and enabled Indian forces to bypass Pakistani strong points and utterly dislodge the Pakistani position in what is now Bangladesh. The Sino-Indian War humiliated the Indian military complex, and the policy that evolved from this humiliation was one motivated by a desire to achieve never to be caught off-balance again. This quest for strategic invulnerability resulted in a change in Indian discourse about the subcontinent and the use of “offensive intelligence,” where organizations in India, especially the Research and Analysis Wing, took measures to actively forward their agendas beyond the Indian borders. After this, India’s agenda was no longer discussed in terms of Indian security, but rather regional security, and Indian leaders put forward ambitious plans to position India as a major world power and voice of the subcontinent.

Israeli diplomacy and military scholar Yaacov Vertzberger offers extensive commentary on the factors that led to the war between China and India. Nehru’s understanding of international law appears to have been idealistic. Specifically, he placed great weight on India’s position in Tibet being supported by international law, while China perceived the laws as being rooted in colonialism in the ways that they made specific reference to territory, and as such, only appealed to them when it served their position. Nehru, being a Western educated lawyer, placed faith in the rule and adherence of international law, and took Chinese concessions to the terms of the McMahon line to be tacit acceptance of Indian legitimacy, when in fact China merely saw the acceptance of these terms as part of the political game for which it would receive favor and consideration at a later time.
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“Jus Post Bellum: Reflections on the Right Way to End a War” by Richard O’Meara

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
There can be no Justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women.

If you break it you own it.

Peace is not sought in order to provoke war, but war is waged in order to attain peace. Be a peacemaker, then, even by fighting, so that through your victory you might bring those whom you defeat to the advantages of peace.

War is tough stuff. It is, at the very least, the organized projection of death and mayhem by some group against another, generally for purposes of governance.4 Its justifications are myriad, running the gamut from self-defense, to humanitarian intervention, to national aggrandizement to whim and revenge. And yet, ironically, it is not the most heinous of human activities. As R. J. Rummel has noted in his discussion of democide, the murder of civilians by government agents acting authoritatively:

[I]n total, during the first eighty-eight years of this century [20th century], almost 170 million men, women, and children have been shot, beaten, tortured, knifed, burned, starved, frozen, crushed, or worked to death; buried alive, drowned, hung, bombed, or killed in any other of the myriad ways governments have inflicted death on unarmed, helpless citizens and foreigners. The dead could conceivably be nearly 360 million people. It is as though our species has been devastated by a modern Black Plague. And indeed it has, but a plague of Power, not germs.

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About the author
Richard M. O’Meara is a retired Brigadier General (USA) and trial attorney who teaches human rights, security issues, and international law in the Division of Global Affairs, Rutgers University. His is also developing a program of study leading to an Associate’s Degree in Homeland Security Studies at Ocean County College, NJ. He has served as a resident fellow at the Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership, US Naval Academy and has taught governance and rule of law issues in such diverse locations as Cambodia, Rwanda, Chad, Philippines, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Moldova, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Peru, El Salvador and Iraq. He served as an EMT for the Red Cross in following the 9/11 attack at the World Trade Center.

“Cyber-terrorism” by Jack Jarmon

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
The Internet is a critical infrastructure necessary to the functioning of commerce government and personal communication and national security. The system is not secure. – Intelligence and National Security Alliance report, November 2009

In a 2002 report prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jim Lewis, a former official with the Department of State and the Department of Commerce wrote:

The idea that hackers are going to bring the nation to its knees is too far-fetched a scenario to be taken seriously. Nations are more robust than the early analysts of cyberterrorism and cyber warfare gave them credit for. Infrastructure systems [are] more flexible and responsive in restoring service than the early analysts realized, in part because they have to deal with failure on a routine basis.

Six years later, in its 2008 report, Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency, the same CSIS concluded:

Interestingly, the project director for the 2008 report was, again, Jim Lewis. The contrast of analysis is not only striking for its reversal of positions, but also in its tone. The 2008 report called for a profound reorganization of our national defenses that embraces a spirit of partnership between the US Government, its allies, and the private sector. It also urges a break with the past on issues of de-regulation, security classification, and the call for leadership in order to drive forward a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy. The authors also concede that the information age has forced us to re-think how federal government operates across boundaries within and outside itself.

How such previous attitudes could have been overturned so radically in a relatively brief span of time reveals more about the dynamic of the information- communication technology (ICT) revolution rather than it does about errors in a particular expert’s analysis. Not only the pace of technology but also the rate of growth and expansion of critical infrastructures, such as government, finance, energy, etc., have intensified our society’s use and dependency upon ICT.
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About the author
Jack Jarmon is the Associate Director of the Command Control and Interoperability Center for Advance Data Analysis at Rutgers University, an adjunct Professor at Seton Hall University and the Chief Research Officer at the New Era Associates. From 2008-2009 he was a lecturer at University of Pennsylvania. He was a technical advisor to USAID in the South Russian Privatization Center. Jarmon got his BA from Rutgers University, an MA from Fordham University and a PhD from Rutgers University. His published piece is one chapter from an upcoming textbook on security studies and international relations.

“Cross-Spectrum Similarities Between Violent Non-State Actors” by Sean Atkins

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
Understanding armed non-state organizations is one of the most pressing concerns in today’s security environment. Whether on the local, state, or international level, violent non-state actors as a whole represent one of the most troubling issues for national security practitioners, and the danger they pose is compounded by their nebulous and elusive natures. As John Robb, a theorist on the evolution of warfare and former special operations pilot, described in his testimony before the US Congress last year:

The threat the US faces today is as dire as the darkest days of the Cold War. In fact, this threat may be even more dangerous because it is so insidious. The threat we face is a combination of global systemic threats … and the rapid emergence of violent non-state groups …

It is also a problem that continues to grow in scope. Terror, insurgent, militia, and criminal groups, equipped with readily available communication and travel technology, have shifted from regional to major strategic challenges. They have increased their “organizational effectiveness, their lethality, and their ability to operate on a truly worldwide scale.”

Further complicating the matter, contemporary researchers have recognized a growing nexus between various types of groups (whether analyzing insurgent groups in Iraq, terrorist groups like Al Qaeda or street in gangs in South America) and increasing similarities in how they operate. These similarities and their increased threat potential urges us to examine the follow-on questions: do deeper similarities exist between these groups and, if so, can the way we deal with one set of groups provide any lessons in dealing with another? Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
Sean Atkins is an active duty officer in the United States Air Force. He has deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan, where some of the ideas presented in this article first took shape. He holds a BA with honors from the University of Southern California and an MA with distinction from King’s College London.

“Fire Down Below: How the Underwear Bomber Revealed the U.S. Counterterrorism Community As Hemmed in by the Seams of Legislative Ambiguity” by Braden Civins

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
On December 25, 2009 a 23-year old Nigerian national boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 253 in Amsterdam, the Netherlands bound for Detroit, Michigan. As the plane neared its final destination, passengers heard sharp popping noises, smelled something acrid, and saw smoke and flames emanating from seat 19A. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, his body covered by a blanket, had triggered an explosive device sewn into the hem of his underwear by mixing the chemical Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate (PETN) with Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP), using an acid-filled syringe. Quick-thinking passengers and crewmembers successfully put out the ensuing fire. None of the 289 people aboard Flight 253 sustained serious injuries. Abdulmutallab was detained immediately upon the flight’s arrival at Detroit Metropolitan Airport by federal authorities and indicted by a federal grand jury two weeks later.

A preliminary review of the events leading up to the Christmas Day attack conducted by the White House “highlight*ed+ human errors and a series of systemic breakdowns” that prevented the detection and disruption of the attack. The review identified several causes for the failure to interdict the plot to bring down Flight 253, but did not specify the degree to which each contributed to the ultimate outcome. Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
Braden Civins, a native Texan, is in his final year of study at The University of Texas, pursuing a J.D. from the School of Law and a Master of Global Policy Studies and specializing in Security Studies at the Lydon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. He is a member of the Texas International Law Journal and former participant in the National Security Clinic, where he co- authored a successful appellate brief on behalf of a Guantanamo Bay detainee. He works at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. He spent recent summers working at the Criminal Prosecutions Division of the Texas Attorney General’s Office, the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Department of State.

“Shedding New Light on North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions” by Nellwyn Olson

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
As the United States confronts new and ever evolving security threats with innovative and adaptive thinking, there is one security threat that has persisted for almost a quarter of a century and has been met with repetitive alarms and cyclical reactions: the North Korean nuclear threat. Almost a decade ago, U.S. relations with North Korea were on an upswing with the October 2000 Joint communiqué expressing mutual interest in achieving peace and security; North/South Korean relations were even significantly improved with the first inter-Korean summit in June of that year. The stark contrast with the current relations with North Korea demonstrates the fluctuating, but ever present task of confronting North Korea nuclear threats. Solutions over how best to deal with North Korea have ranged from military intervention, United Nations Security Council sanctions, bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations, to stick-and-carrot offerings. The dialogue over North Korea’s nuclear issue has reignited after each nuclear test or discovery and has often led to equating North Korean nuclear endeavors with the production of nuclear weapons.

Siegfried Hecker’s most recent visit to North Korea’s Yongbyon site in November 2010 reignited controversies over the country’s nuclear ambitions and nuclear weapons program. As one of the world’s most demonized countries, North Korea’s endeavors often occasion analysts’ worst-case scenarios and the international community’s stick-and-carrot treatment. Whether North Korea deserves this reputation is open to interpretation which will not be addressed in this paper. Perceptions regarding North Korea are problematic however, when they are derived from over-generalized assessments, intuitive leaps, and preconceived expectations. This paper seeks to articulate a more nuanced assessment of North Korea’s current nuclear program by highlighting how common and problematic intuitive leaps create obstacles for an accurate evaluation of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and can harm future negotiations. Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
Nellwyn Olson is currently a Master of Arts candidate in International Relations at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, where she is focusing on Global Security and East Asia foreign policy. Her research interests include identifying the illicit flow of nuclear materials in East Asia and the smuggling routes of drugs and weapons throughout Southeast Asia and Oceania. She graduated with a Bachelors in Business Administration from the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan where she studied corporate strategy, Southeast Asian area studies, and economics.

“Salient but Unappreciated: Issues in National and International Security and Defense Policy for the Next Decade” by Christain Geib

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
As much as scholars of all academic disciplines would like to think of their discipline as purely based on observation and analysis, undoubtedly they are subject to temporary fashion cycles which influence the debate beyond mere scientific findings and scientific reasoning.

Military strategy and defense policy are no exception to that. Throughout military history, military thinkers have been subject to such cycles with concerns to the question of what really was at the contemporary cutting edge nature of warfare and what the future of warfare would be like. Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
Christian Geib is pursuing a LLM at Stanford Law School. He earned his degree of Bachelor of Law – LL.B. (J.D. equivalent) in 2006 as part of a multilingual/multijurisdictional degree of the Hanse Law School Program between the Universities of Bremen, Oldenburg (Germany) and Groningen (The Netherlands). Prior to his law school studies, he studied political science at the University of Tübingen (Germany) and the Catholic University of Santiago de Chile. During his studies, he interned at the German Parliament, the international law department of the German Ministry of Defense, and in corporate investment banking of Deutsche Bank. Following his graduation, he worked with a large retail company and for a science and research policy project of the European Commission. Geib is a reserve officer with the German Armed Forces.

“Somali Piracy and the Western Response” by Brendon Noto

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
September 9, 2010, Captain Alexander Martin and 23 Marines, of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, climbed onboard the Motor Vessel Magellan Star, which had been hijacked by Somali pirates the previous day. The boarding was the latest example of the US military’s willingness to use force in order to rescue hostage sailors. Western navies have used force to in order to remove Somali pirates from hijacked ships with increased frequency. It is likely that this will result in increased casualties in what was the relatively peaceful practice of Somali piracy.

Piracy became a threat to shipping after the collapse of Somalia’s government in 1991, and Somalia’s emergence as a, if not the, failed state. This threat, which has conjured images of pirates from the Caribbean or the Barbary states, should not be ignored as a threat from the past. Somali pirates have shown the willingness and the ability to attack energy and weapons shipments. The Gulf of Aden is the sea lane used to transport the majority of Europe’s oil from the Middle East. If left unchecked piracy could have a negative impact on Western quality of life, and have a destabilizing effect on East Africa.

Piracy is an internationally recognized crime, but Western states have been of two minds about it. America and the European Union (EU), which have shown a willingness to send ships to protect international shipping, lost interest when it was time to prosecute pirates. This duality of purpose was a symptom of how policy makers saw pirates as potential terrorists on one hand, and obsolete criminals on the other. Until Western leaders stop exaggerating the threat of piracy by linking it with terrorism without evidence to support such claims, and ridiculing pirates as an anachronistic threat, they will not develop a coherent policy to address the threat. Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
Brendon Noto graduated from the University at Albany with a BA in European History and American Politics. He is pursuing his MA in International, Global and Comparative History at the University at Albany. His subjects of interest include naval policy and post-Cold War International Relations. Brendon Noto served in the U.S. Navy and conducted anti-piracy and Visit Board Search and Seizure operations off the coast of Somalia over the course of two deployments.

“An Assessment of UK Anti-Terrorism Strategy and the Human Rights Implications Associated with its Implementation” by Emmanouela Mylonaki and Tim Burton

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
Following 9/11, anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom became more stringent, thus widening the scope of offences that qualify as terrorist acts and encroaching on the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the accused. Despite the distinction between the terms ‘anti-terrorism’ and ‘counter- terrorism’ they are often used interchangeably. Whereas counter-terrorism broadly refers to offensive measures of a preventive, deterrent and pre-emptive nature, anti-terrorism refers to the construction and use of defensive measures to reduce a terrorist threat. Anti- terrorism, by definition, is therefore narrower in scope.

The varied nature of terrorist offences necessitates a range of governmental responses, which poses difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of the UK anti- terrorism strategy by using a universal methodology. Instead a comparative approach is used to identify similarities between the anti-terrorism strategy in the United Kingdom and the United States. Besides the effectiveness of a strategy in achieving its political aims, legitimacy and public confidence are equally important factors, and thus emphasis is places on such factors. Continue reading (PDF)

About the authors
Dr. Emmanouela Mylonaki is a Senior Lecturer in Law at London South Bank University, UK and Director of Postgraduate Studies. Mylonaki holds an LLB from the University of Athens, an LLM in International Law University of Westminster, an MPhil in Criminology from Cambridge and a PhD in Law from Bristol University. Her academic research focuses broadly on international criminal law and more specifically on international terrorism and counter-terrorism legislation.

Tim Burton is a Crown Prosecutor currently working in London. He holds an LLB degree and an LLM in Crime and Litigation from London South Bank University. He is a guest lecturer on terrorism and policing at London South Bank University.

“Creating More Turmoil: Why UAV strikes Will Be Counterproductive in Yemen” by William Mayborn

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
This paper seeks to answer the question of whether the U.S. should expand the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to execute targeted killings in Yemen. This is an important question for two reasons: 1) al Qaeda affiliates use Yemen as a safe haven for planning and executing terrorist operations, and 2) the current political upheaval in Tunisia, Libiya and Egypt is encouraging further demonstrations and protests in Yemen. To answer the UAV expansion question this paper will examine political instability issues in Yemen, recent Yemeni terrorist activities, current U.S. policy towards Yemen, previous use of a Predator drone in Yemen, and ways to improve Yemen-U.S. counter- terrorism cooperation.Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
William Mayborn is from Dallas, Texas, and received his bachelor’s degree in Asian Studies and History from the University of Texas at Austin. William spent a considerable amount of time in China studying Chinese, teaching English, and pursuing business ventures. He is now currently pursuing his master’s degree at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University in College Station. His security study interests are in counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, Afghan military issues, and Chinese security issues.