Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
As the United States confronts new and ever evolving security threats with innovative and adaptive thinking, there is one security threat that has persisted for almost a quarter of a century and has been met with repetitive alarms and cyclical reactions: the North Korean nuclear threat. Almost a decade ago, U.S. relations with North Korea were on an upswing with the October 2000 Joint communiqué expressing mutual interest in achieving peace and security; North/South Korean relations were even significantly improved with the first inter-Korean summit in June of that year. The stark contrast with the current relations with North Korea demonstrates the fluctuating, but ever present task of confronting North Korea nuclear threats. Solutions over how best to deal with North Korea have ranged from military intervention, United Nations Security Council sanctions, bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations, to stick-and-carrot offerings. The dialogue over North Korea’s nuclear issue has reignited after each nuclear test or discovery and has often led to equating North Korean nuclear endeavors with the production of nuclear weapons.

Siegfried Hecker’s most recent visit to North Korea’s Yongbyon site in November 2010 reignited controversies over the country’s nuclear ambitions and nuclear weapons program. As one of the world’s most demonized countries, North Korea’s endeavors often occasion analysts’ worst-case scenarios and the international community’s stick-and-carrot treatment. Whether North Korea deserves this reputation is open to interpretation which will not be addressed in this paper. Perceptions regarding North Korea are problematic however, when they are derived from over-generalized assessments, intuitive leaps, and preconceived expectations. This paper seeks to articulate a more nuanced assessment of North Korea’s current nuclear program by highlighting how common and problematic intuitive leaps create obstacles for an accurate evaluation of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and can harm future negotiations. Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
Nellwyn Olson is currently a Master of Arts candidate in International Relations at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, where she is focusing on Global Security and East Asia foreign policy. Her research interests include identifying the illicit flow of nuclear materials in East Asia and the smuggling routes of drugs and weapons throughout Southeast Asia and Oceania. She graduated with a Bachelors in Business Administration from the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan where she studied corporate strategy, Southeast Asian area studies, and economics.

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
September 9, 2010, Captain Alexander Martin and 23 Marines, of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, climbed onboard the Motor Vessel Magellan Star, which had been hijacked by Somali pirates the previous day. The boarding was the latest example of the US military’s willingness to use force in order to rescue hostage sailors. Western navies have used force to in order to remove Somali pirates from hijacked ships with increased frequency. It is likely that this will result in increased casualties in what was the relatively peaceful practice of Somali piracy.

Piracy became a threat to shipping after the collapse of Somalia’s government in 1991, and Somalia’s emergence as a, if not the, failed state. This threat, which has conjured images of pirates from the Caribbean or the Barbary states, should not be ignored as a threat from the past. Somali pirates have shown the willingness and the ability to attack energy and weapons shipments. The Gulf of Aden is the sea lane used to transport the majority of Europe’s oil from the Middle East. If left unchecked piracy could have a negative impact on Western quality of life, and have a destabilizing effect on East Africa.

Piracy is an internationally recognized crime, but Western states have been of two minds about it. America and the European Union (EU), which have shown a willingness to send ships to protect international shipping, lost interest when it was time to prosecute pirates. This duality of purpose was a symptom of how policy makers saw pirates as potential terrorists on one hand, and obsolete criminals on the other. Until Western leaders stop exaggerating the threat of piracy by linking it with terrorism without evidence to support such claims, and ridiculing pirates as an anachronistic threat, they will not develop a coherent policy to address the threat. Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
Brendon Noto graduated from the University at Albany with a BA in European History and American Politics. He is pursuing his MA in International, Global and Comparative History at the University at Albany. His subjects of interest include naval policy and post-Cold War International Relations. Brendon Noto served in the U.S. Navy and conducted anti-piracy and Visit Board Search and Seizure operations off the coast of Somalia over the course of two deployments.

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
Following 9/11, anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom became more stringent, thus widening the scope of offences that qualify as terrorist acts and encroaching on the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the accused. Despite the distinction between the terms ‘anti-terrorism’ and ‘counter- terrorism’ they are often used interchangeably. Whereas counter-terrorism broadly refers to offensive measures of a preventive, deterrent and pre-emptive nature, anti-terrorism refers to the construction and use of defensive measures to reduce a terrorist threat. Anti- terrorism, by definition, is therefore narrower in scope.

The varied nature of terrorist offences necessitates a range of governmental responses, which poses difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of the UK anti- terrorism strategy by using a universal methodology. Instead a comparative approach is used to identify similarities between the anti-terrorism strategy in the United Kingdom and the United States. Besides the effectiveness of a strategy in achieving its political aims, legitimacy and public confidence are equally important factors, and thus emphasis is places on such factors. Continue reading (PDF)

About the authors
Dr. Emmanouela Mylonaki is a Senior Lecturer in Law at London South Bank University, UK and Director of Postgraduate Studies. Mylonaki holds an LLB from the University of Athens, an LLM in International Law University of Westminster, an MPhil in Criminology from Cambridge and a PhD in Law from Bristol University. Her academic research focuses broadly on international criminal law and more specifically on international terrorism and counter-terrorism legislation.

Tim Burton is a Crown Prosecutor currently working in London. He holds an LLB degree and an LLM in Crime and Litigation from London South Bank University. He is a guest lecturer on terrorism and policing at London South Bank University.

Note: This paper appeared in the 6th Volume of the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis in Spring 2011.

Excerpt
This paper seeks to answer the question of whether the U.S. should expand the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to execute targeted killings in Yemen. This is an important question for two reasons: 1) al Qaeda affiliates use Yemen as a safe haven for planning and executing terrorist operations, and 2) the current political upheaval in Tunisia, Libiya and Egypt is encouraging further demonstrations and protests in Yemen. To answer the UAV expansion question this paper will examine political instability issues in Yemen, recent Yemeni terrorist activities, current U.S. policy towards Yemen, previous use of a Predator drone in Yemen, and ways to improve Yemen-U.S. counter- terrorism cooperation.Continue reading (PDF)

About the author
William Mayborn is from Dallas, Texas, and received his bachelor’s degree in Asian Studies and History from the University of Texas at Austin. William spent a considerable amount of time in China studying Chinese, teaching English, and pursuing business ventures. He is now currently pursuing his master’s degree at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University in College Station. His security study interests are in counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, Afghan military issues, and Chinese security issues.