



North Waziristan

The Ground Realities

By Sabina Khan

Siloviki Syndicalists

—By Frederick S. Schultz

The Evolving Terrorist Threat

*Adapting United States' Counter-Terrorism
Strategy*

By Avi Panth & Chris Edelman

Understanding Suicide Terrorism

A Case Study of Pakistan

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A review by Tom Smith

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Contributors

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Chris Edelman graduated Summa Cum Laude from Duke University where he was a Robertson Scholar. At Duke, he majored in Decision Science and spent his summers traveling throughout South America researching the FARC and Shining Path terrorist organizations and earning a certificate in Latin American Studies. He is now completing a Master of Philosophy in International Relations at the University of Cambridge, where his research focuses on government and terrorist group interaction. Following his time at

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North Waziristan

The Ground Realities

By Sabina Khan

Introduction

The successful May 1, 2011 raid on Osama Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad has emboldened the United States to intensify pressure on Pakistan to conduct operations in the tribal agency of North Waziristan. The purpose of such an operation would be to target the Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban.¹ With the NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) withdrawal deadline approaching, lack of operations in North Waziristan is being framed as the source of continued resistance in Afghanistan.

After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the war on terror surged into the urban areas of Pakistan. Over 30,000 civilians and 3,500 military personnel have perished thus far as a result of terrorist violence in the country.² Extended conflict and massive natural disasters have yielded the highest internal refugee population in the world.³ Year-round rolling blackouts and incessant drone strikes within Pakistan's borders further amplify

tensions and have left the weak government of Pakistan struggling to maintain control. The accidental killing of 24 Pakistani troops by NATO was the latest test of Pakistani government's resolve.⁴ The Pakistan military has conducted operations in six of the seven agencies with the exception of North Waziristan. Military operations in this agency remain a contentious subject between the two allies. Pakistan has stated that it does not have the means to open up another front and must focus on militant groups which carry out terrorist attacks within the country. Meanwhile the US asserts that Pakistan is providing sanctuary to the Haqqani network in order to gain a controlling influence in Afghanistan once coalition forces withdraw.⁵

This paper examines the possibility of conducting military operations in North Waziristan along with the complexities and intricacies involved. The US, India, and Afghanistan have vested interests in the future of the region. Their roles will also be discussed at length in order to shed greater light on the subject.

North Waziristan

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan are located in a narrow belt which runs along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border also known as the Durand Line. Nearly 1,500 miles of unforgiving, harsh mountainous terrain

1. Barbara Starr, "US targeting Haqqani network in Pakistan," CNN, September 21, 2011, <<http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/21/us-targeting-haqqani-network-in-pakistan/>>.

2. John Bingham, "Bin Laden: 3,519 days, 2 wars, \$1.283 trillion, Tens of Thousands of Lives," The Telegraph, May 13, 2011, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8488157/Bin-Laden-3519-days-2-wars-1.283-trillion-tens-of-thousands-of-lives.html>>.

3. 2012 U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees Country Operations Profile, UNHCR, <<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487016.html>>.

4. "Pakistan buries 24 troops killed in NATO airstrike," BBC, November 27, 2011, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15908760>>.

5. Rob Crilly, "Pakistan using Haqqani network to wage 'proxy war' in Afghanistan", The Telegraph, September 21, 2011, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8779093/Pakistan-using-Haqqani-network-to-wage-proxy-war-in-Afghanistan.html>>.

serves as the border between the two countries. The tribal areas of Pakistan are mostly populated by Pashtuns and consist of seven agencies, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.

North Waziristan is characterized by rugged hills with deep gorges and it is mostly impassable. Approximately 350,000 people reside there and is home to some of the most dangerous militants, mainly the Haqqani network.⁶

In 2002, the Pakistani military began combat operations in North Waziristan. However, in 2006, a peace agreement known as the Waziristan Accord was signed to end conflict in the agency.⁷ Under the agreement tribal elders pledged not to attack state property or security personnel in Pakistan. In return, the government of Pakistan promised not to undertake any ground or air operations in North Waziristan and to resolve disputes through local tribal customs and traditions.⁸ The short lived deal broke down in 2007 after militants from Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) burnt down the Ministry of Environment and attacked the Army Rangers guarding it. This led to a siege of the Lal Masjid by the security forces and resulted in the deaths of 154 militants. Taliban members subsequently retaliated by carrying out violent attacks against the Pakistan military.⁹

In response, the Pakistan government stated that the peace accord was signed with tribal elders and not with the Taliban.¹⁰ In 2008, the peace agreement was revived and the tribes of North Waziristan agreed to jointly struggle against terrorism and extremism in the agency. However, the use of drone strikes by the United States and recent attack on Pakistani checkpoints by militants in North Waziristan threaten the peace deal.¹¹

Militant Groups in North Waziristan

North Waziristan hosts a web of militant groups and tribes including the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Their hideouts are located in the mountains between Miramshah, North Waziristan's capital, and the Afghan border. Media sources estimate that several hundred foreign al-Qaeda fighters reside in the North Waziristan, mostly from Arab countries and Uzbekistan, as well as a few Africans, Chechens and Westerners.¹² The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) are two particular Uzbek factions residing in North Waziristan. Both organizations are beginning to extend deeper into the country and have ties to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network.¹³

6 Kathy Gannon, "North Waziristan: new epicenter of terror fight," Associated Press, October 25, 2007, <<http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/10/ap-pakistan-north-waziristan-new-epicenter-of-terror-fight-102510/>>.

7 Evagoras C. Leventis, "The Waziristan Accord," Global Politician, December 18, 2007, <<http://www.globalpolitician.com/23893-pakistan>>.

8 Ibid.

9 "Scores killed in Pakistan attacks", BBC News, July 19, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6905808.stm>.

10 "Convoy ambush toll rises to 27: Taliban scraps North Waziristan peace deal", Dawn News, June 30, 2009, <<http://archives.dawn.com/archives/41619>>.

11 Manzoor Ali, "North Waziristan: Haqqani aide threatens to scrap peace deal," The Express Tribune, November 13, 2011, <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/290764/n-waziristan-militant-leader-threatens-government/>>.

12 "Qaeda firmly rooted in Pakistan tribal fiefdom: report", Agence France-Presse, August 26, 2011, <<http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/26/qaeda-firmly-rooted-in-pakistan-tribal-fiefdom.html>>.

13 Jeffrey Dressler, "A Dangerous Mix: Militant groups in North Waziristan," AEI Critical Threats, June 1, 2011, <<http://www.criti->

The Haqqani network

The Haqqani network is an al-Qaeda linked insurgent group in Afghanistan and Pakistan that is closely allied with the Taliban.¹⁴ Though the Haqqanis claim they no longer need safe havens in Pakistan and have shifted to Afghanistan, it is believed that they still maintain a presence in North Waziristan.¹⁵ Many deadly attacks on the US led coalition forces in Afghanistan are suspected to have Haqqani origins. The aging leader of the group, Jalaluddin Haqqani, is a former anti-Soviet resistance commander from Afghanistan's Khost Province. Haqqani established a base in Pakistan's tribal areas in the 1970s. He received funding from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and Saudi Arabia to support resistance to the Soviets. After Soviet troops left, Haqqani allied with the Taliban during Afghanistan's civil wars. Haqqani's son, Sirajuddin has taken over operational command and is focusing on driving out US and Afghan government forces from Afghanistan. The network is active in Afghanistan's southeastern areas of Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Logar, and Ghazni Province.

calthreats.org/pakistan/dangerous-mix-militant-groups-north-waziristan-june-1-2011>.

14 Anand Gopal, "The most deadly US foe in Afghanistan", Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 2009, <<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/0601/p10s01-wosc.html>>.

15 "No sanctuaries in Pakistan: Haqqani network shifts base to Afghanistan", The Express Tribune, September 18, 2011, <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/254368/no-haqqani-network-sanctuaries-in-pakistan-sirajuddin/>>.

Hafiz Gul Bahudur

Besides the Haqqanis, Hafiz Gul Bahudur is another prominent militant leader in North Waziristan. He fought in Afghanistan during the civil war following the Soviet withdrawal and became a political activist in the Islamist party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) upon his return to North Waziristan.

Bahadur has relations with various groups, including the Haqqanis in North Waziristan, but has been careful to avoid confrontation with the Pakistani state. His strategy is similar to the Haqqanis' which focuses more on US and NATO troops in Afghanistan.¹⁶ However, Bahadur has provided anti-Pakistan militants from the southern territory a safe haven in North Waziristan since June 2009.¹⁷ Conversely, the Pakistan military has used territory that is under his area of influence to launch operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP).¹⁸

TTP (Pakistan Taliban)

The TTP was set up by Baitullah Mehsud in 1996 to unleash chaos on Pakistan due to its support of the US. This group consists of anti-Pakistan

16 Anand Gopal, and Mansur Khan Mahsud with Brian Fishman, "Inside Pakistan's tribal frontier: North Waziristan," The AfPak Channel, April 23, 2010, <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/23/inside_pakistans_tribal_frontier_north_waziristan>.

17 Gopal, "Inside Pakistan's tribal frontier: North Waziristan," Foreign Policy, April 23, 2010, <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/23/inside_pakistans_tribal_frontier_north_waziristan>.

18 Reza Jan, "The FATA Conflict After South Waziristan: Pakistan's War Continues Against Militants in Orakzai, Bajaur and North Waziristan," AEI Critical Threats Project, February 22, 2010, <http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_FATA_Conflict_After_South_Waziristan.pdf>.

groups operating in Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, Swat and Dir regions.¹⁹ After the Pakistani army conducted operations in South Waziristan targeting TTP's headquarters in October 2009, the TTP leadership relocated to North Waziristan.²⁰ It maintains close ties with various other groups including the Haqqani network, al Qaeda, and the Punjab based Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

An assortment of other jihadi groups also exist in North Waziristan and the situation is clearly troublesome as the unity among the militants is crumbling.²¹ Those allied with the Haqqani network want to concentrate all of their efforts on Afghanistan, hence the peace accord with the Pakistan army. Meanwhile the Al-Qaeda-linked militants, including Punjabis, see the Pakistani state as well as the coalition forces across the border in Afghanistan as enemies.²²

United States

The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 toppled the Taliban but inadvertently led to a surge of militants into Pakistan's tribal areas. The US considers North Waziristan a base for al-Qaeda headquarters and the most dangerous place in the world. Former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen called North Waziristan

the "epicenter of terrorism."²³ President Obama publicly claims North Waziristan is key to winning the Afghan war.²⁴ Although they maintain a working relationship, the US and Pakistan have different strategic interests in North Waziristan. The Pakistan military is concerned, first and foremost, with the militant hubs that are used to launch attacks within Pakistan. The US, on the other hand, is concerned about militants that cross into Afghanistan and target coalition forces. The US criticizes Pakistan's inaction in North Waziristan. Pakistan retorts that it does not have the resources to open another front.

Condemning Pakistan's failure to act in North Waziristan, the US is pursuing an intense drone strike campaign in North Waziristan to kill and disrupt Al Qaeda, Taliban and other militants operating in the area. Nearly 300 drone strikes have been launched since 2004. There were 118 strikes in 2010 alone.²⁵ Leadership of Al Qaeda has been reportedly disrupted as a result. However, these drone strikes violate Pakistan's sovereignty and produce collateral damage which has a negative impact on the US image in Pakistan. According to a report by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a non-profit organization based in London, a drone strike occurs every four days. The group estimates that the drone program has caused at least 392 civilian casualties, including 175 children,

¹⁹ Chaghai Helmand, "The Afghan-Pakistan militant nexus," BBC, October 6, 2011, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15149996>>.

²⁰ Bill Roggio, "Taliban attack Pakistan Army in North Waziristan," Long War Journal, August 14, 2011 http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2011/08/taliban_attack_pakistani_army.php.

²¹ Arif Jamal, "Floods Wash Out Counterterrorist Operations in North Waziristan," Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 8 Issue: 34

²² Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Showdown looms in North Waziristan," Asia Times, April 28, 2010 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LD28Df04.html>.

²³ Gannon, "New epicenter of terror fight," The Washington Post, October 12, 2010, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/2010/oct/26/pakistan-border-region-becomes-terror-epicenter/?page=all>>.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ "The year of the drone", New America Foundation, 2004-2011, <<http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones/2011>>.

since 2004.²⁶

The US and Pakistan shared a mutual understanding of the predator drone program, even if it was not acknowledged publicly.²⁷ This relationship came to a sudden halt following the NATO attack on two Pakistani checkpoints on November 26th of 2011. Pakistan reacted by shutting down the Shamsi air base which was being used by the CIA to conduct drone strikes in the tribal areas.²⁸

In light of the upcoming 2014 deadline for the coalition troop withdrawal, the US has reversed its Afghan strategy and is now negotiating with the Afghan Taliban through third parties. Senator John Kerry, Democratic Senator of Massachusetts, said in an NPR interview that there is “no military solution” for Afghanistan and that “there are very active efforts now to seek an appropriate kind of political settlement.”²⁹ According to NATO, coalition forces in Afghanistan have been facilitating the talks and have provided safe passage for senior Taliban leaders to visit Kabul.³⁰ The United States held an exploratory meeting with the Haqqani network, which was arranged by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI.³¹ Thus, contradictory strate-

gies are being pursued. Pakistan is being asked to attack the Haqqanis in North Waziristan and also bring them to the negotiating table at the same time.

Failing to clear the Kunar and Nuristan provinces in Afghanistan, US forces withdrew from the area as detailed by the New York Times.³² Numerous insurgent groups remain firmly established in these two remote and violent provinces which border Pakistan’s tribal areas. These militants continue to cross into Pakistan and carry out attacks.³³ Thus, Pakistan had to move troops to Chitral, Upper and Lower Dir to combat repeated incursions by the Taliban into Pakistani territory.³⁴ Pakistan has accused ISAF and the Afghan National Army (ANA) for allowing these groups to thrive in Afghanistan.³⁵

Pakistan

Following September 11, 2001, Pakistan deployed the largest number of troops in the world to fight the spread of terrorism, 140,000 in total.³⁶ Compare their commitment to the 140,000 coali-

26 Chris Woods, Covert Drone War, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, August 10, 2011, <<http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/most-complete-picture-yet-of-cia-drone-strikes/>>.

27 Tim Lister, “WikiLeaks: Pakistan quietly approved drone attacks, US special units,” CNN, December 2, 2010, <<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/12/01/wikileaks.pakistan.drones/>>.

28 Salman Masood, CIA leaves base in Pakistan used for drone strikes, New York Times, December 11, 2011, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/world/asia/cia-leaves-pakistan-base-used-for-drone-strikes.html>>.

29 David Gura, “It’s critical to understand instability risk in Pakistan,” NPR, August 20, 2010, <<http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/08/20/129327894/it-s-critical-to-understand-instability-risk-in-pakistan-john-kerry-tells-npr>>.

30 Adam Entous, “US encourages Afghan led Taliban talks,” Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2010, <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704361504575552092245669952.html>>.

31 “US meets Haqqani network: Clinton,” Express Tribune, October 21, 2011, <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/278892/us-met-haqqani-network-clinton/>>.

clinton/>.

32 C.J. Chivers, Alissa J. Rubin, Wesley Morgan, “US pulling back in Afghan Valley it called vital to war,” February 24, 2011, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/asia/25afghanistan.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all>.

33 “Cross-border attacks: Army, FC sent to areas bordering Afghanistan,” Express Tribune, October 18, 2011, <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/276646/cross-border-attack-army-fc-sent-to-areas-bordering-afghanistan/>>.

34 “Troops deployed along border in Dir, Chitral,” Dawn News, September 13, 2011, <<http://www.dawn.com/2011/09/13/troops-deployed-along-border-in-dir-chitral.html>>.

35 Bill Roggio, “Taliban kill 25 Pakistani troops in cross-border attack,” Long War Journal, August 27, 2011, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/taliban_kill_25_paki.php>.

36 Steve Inskeep, “Pakistan, Militants in Deadly Border Fight,” NPR, June 6, 2011, <<http://www.npr.org/2011/06/06/136977007/pakistan-militants-in-deadly-border-fight>>.

tion forces in Afghanistan made up of troops from 48 countries.³⁷ According to the Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11, the country's economy has suffered direct and indirect losses of up to \$67.93 billion since 2001 when it became a frontline state in the 'war against terrorism.'³⁸

There are 34,000 Pakistani troops (six brigades) specific to North Waziristan and they actively carry out "surgical" raids against militants in the agency, comprising of unit level operations. Pakistan has not announced a date for a large-scale operation as of yet.³⁹ To conduct such an operation would require several more infantry divisions since the terrain is quite harsh and there will be immense blow back in the form of political and terrorist attacks to deal with.⁴⁰

Pakistan has raised numerous concerns about conducting operations in North Waziristan. A military entrance into North Waziristan could scatter the militants across Pakistan causing even further havoc in the country. Pakistan is also sensitive to the threat of a fierce backlash from Pashtuns in the tribal belts and accusations of fighting America's war.⁴¹ North Waziristan's terrain will lead to heavy casualties of Pakistani troops and a large-

scale operation in North Waziristan would also jeopardize the military's clean-up efforts in other areas.

If Pakistani forces do conduct operations in North Waziristan then most likely the Afghan Haqqani network will not be their target. Pakistan is also looking to safeguard its interests once NATO leaves Afghanistan. It believes that operations against the Haqqani network would open another front and make enemies out of allies which could prove useful in Afghanistan once the coalition forces leave. Historic ties exist between the ISI and the Haqqani network.

There are various strategic aspects which will determine the future of Pakistan military operations in North Waziristan. Amongst the main factors preventing Pakistan from conducting operations in North Waziristan is its relationship with neighboring India and Afghanistan. Conflict throughout the area shared by these nations has been documented for thousands of years. Bringing about significant reform will be a painstaking process. Pakistan has cited several reasons for delaying operations in North Waziristan including the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, the US peace talks with the Taliban, plus the widening influence of India in Afghanistan.

India

After the fall of the Taliban, India moved quickly to establish its influence in Afghanistan. The country built consulates in Herat and Mazhar-e-Sharif and reopened old ones in Kandahar

37 "Foreign forces in Afghanistan," BBC, July 20, 2011, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11371138>>.

38 "War on Terror cost Pakistan \$67.9 billion," Dawn News, June 20, 2011, <<http://www.dawn.com/2011/06/20/war-on-terror-cost-pakistan-679-billion.html>>.

39 Imtiaz Gul, "Is North Waziristan Next?" AfPak Channel, March 4, 2010, <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/04/is_north_waziristan_next>.

40 Rob Crilly, "Pakistan hits back at American support for India by stopping al-Qaeda offensive," The Telegraph, November 22, 2010, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8151875/Pakistan-hits-back-at-American-support-for-India-by-stopping-al-Qaeda-offensive.html>>.

41 Kathy Gannon, "Pakistan border region becomes terror epicenter," Washington Times, October 26, 2010, <<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/26/pakistan-border-region-becomes-terror-epicenter/?page=1>>.

and Jalalabad which had been closed since 1979. India is also one of Kabul's leading donors and has pledged a total of \$2 billion for rebuilding the infrastructure.⁴² Funds have been allocated for food aid, education, health, power and strengthening the governance system. Bilateral trade between Afghanistan and India has increased.

In 2008 President Obama called for a comprehensive regional solution linking Kashmir to problems on the Af-Pak border. In an interview with Time magazine, he stated that resolving the Kashmir conflict would be critical for his administration's efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁴³ However, when Richard Holbrooke was appointed special representative for the region, his brief did not include India or Kashmir. The reason for this exclusion was India's intense lobbying in Washington to leave Kashmir off Holbrooke's agenda.⁴⁴ Kashmir remains the top priority for the Pakistani military and complicates the possibility of operations in North Waziristan. This is one of the key issues which is preventing Pakistan from moving its forces away from the Indian border. India has also been accused of funneling arms and money to insurgents into Pakistan's Baluchistan through the Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad.⁴⁵ India's Cold Start Doctrine is a plan to deploy new ground forces that could strike inside Paki-

stan quickly in the event of a conflict. This strategy aims to send expeditious groups to deliver a limited retaliatory ground strike within a few days of suffering a terrorist attack by militants based in Pakistan, yet not do enough damage to set off a nuclear strike.⁴⁶ Pakistani officials have told the US that worries about Cold Start is the source of their refusal to move forces away from the border with India so that they can conduct operations near Afghanistan.⁴⁷ Since India's Cold Start Doctrine is Pakistan-specific, planning has gone into defending against Cold Start implementation, and tactics include shifting troops from FATA to the Indian border. Meanwhile, others who have reviewed the facts do not pay Cold Start the same level of seriousness. The former US ambassador to India, Timothy Roemer, described India's strategy as a "mixture of myth and reality" and that it is unlikely that India would implement it. He added that even if the Cold Start strategy was executed its success would be "questionable."⁴⁸

Afghanistan

"Afghanistan has been a prize that Pakistan and India have fought over directly and indirectly for decades," wrote analyst Robert Kaplan.⁴⁹ Dur-

42 "Indian PM Manmohan Singh pledges \$500m to Afghanistan," BBC, May 12, 2011, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13370637>>.

43 Joe Klien, "The full Obama Interview," Time, October 23, 2008, <http://swampland.time.com/2008/10/23/the_full_obama_interview/>.

44 Laura Rozen, "India's stealth lobbying against Holbrooke's brief," Foreign Policy, January 24, 2009, <http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/23/india_s_stealth_lobbying_against_holbrooke>.

45 Christine Fair, "What's the problem with Pakistan," Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2009, <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan>>.

46 Dr Subash Kapila, "India's new Cold Start doctrine strategically reviewed," South Asia Analysis Group, May 5, 2004, <<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html>>.

47 Lydia Polgreen, "Obama Is Not Likely to Push India Hard on Pakistan," New York Times, November 5, 2010, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/06/world/asia/06india.html>>.

48 US Embassy Cable, "India unlikely to deploy Cold Start against Pakistan," Guardian, November 30, 2010, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/248971>>.

49 Jayshree Bajoria, "India-Afghanistan Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, July 22, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/17474/indiaafghanistan_relations.html>.

ing the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, India supported the Soviet Union and backed the communist regime of President Najibullah, while the United States and Pakistan supported the Mujahideen with their resistance to the intruders. After the defeat of the Soviet Union the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, ending a lengthy and bloody civil war. When the dust settled India was left without any real influence in the country. The Taliban regime called itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and gained diplomatic recognition from only three states: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.⁵⁰ Pakistan had been a supporter of the Taliban until President Pervez Musharraf agreed to assist US forces in overthrowing the Taliban following the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Toppling the former power in Afghanistan changed the dynamics of the country. Afghans who are in power today are ideologically different. They include Shias who are inclined towards Iranian influence as well as other minorities from the North such as Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. The Northern Alliance reached new heights of power after the US overthrew the Pashtuns. This resulted in a dramatic decline in the representation of Pashtuns who were unable to join the armed forces, government, and law enforcement ranks. The Pashtuns represent a cohesive majority in Afghanistan and their intentional marginalization cannot be sustained in any natural manner.

⁵⁰ "Afghanistan Disintegrates: Implications for Counter-Terrorism," Center for Defense Information, September 27, 2010, <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-disintegrates-pr.html>>.

In 2001, the US offensive in Afghanistan advanced from the west towards the east and pushed out the Taliban militants into Pakistan. The border is soft on accounts of the Durand Line regulated by the "easement rights;" which entitles individuals to move freely across the border if their tribes have been divided.⁵¹ Pakistani Pashtuns welcomed the Afghan Taliban with open arms because of a common ethnicity and a history of integration since the Soviet occupation. Considering their conflict with the Northern Alliance, Pashtuns are inclined to negotiate directly with the US and not with the Afghanistan government. The US participation in these talks actively undermines their own onetime goal to have Afghanistan lead the upcoming transition of power.

Even if North Waziristan is cleared, coalition difficulties in Afghanistan will not automatically cease to exist. The US withdrew forces from Helmand and Kandahar and shifted its presence to the eastern provinces bordering North Waziristan. Meanwhile the insurgent groups in Nuristan and Kunar are thriving since there is no presence of coalition troops in those territories.⁵² These groups continue to conduct insurgency in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The 8,000-foot high mountains in North Waziristan possess a myriad of escape routes into

⁵¹ Ahmer Bilal Soofi, "A law for crossing the Durand Line," The News, October 8, 2011, <<http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=9412&Cat=13>>.

⁵² C.J. Chivers, Alissa J. Rubin, Wesley Morgan, "US pulling back in Afghan Valley it called vital to war," New York Times, February 24, 2011, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/asia/25afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all>>.

Afghanistan. These routes must be addressed in order to prevent the militants from fleeing into Afghanistan to avoid defeat. Pakistan has four times the number of border posts compared to NATO.⁵³ Given the number of unequal checkpoints on each side of the Durand Line, a permanent push of militants outside of North Waziristan is currently impossible because Afghanistan will continue to provide militants strategic depth for retreat.⁵⁴ If military operations are conducted in North Waziristan, they will prioritize addressing the Pakistani Taliban, which has declared war on the government of Pakistan. Instead of a major assault, selective operations will be conducted in North Waziristan to shrink the space for local facilitators of al-Qaeda, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.⁵⁵

Both the US and Pakistan consider Haqqani an important player in the reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan will hold on to the Pash-tun card (Haqqani) since it believes that Afghanistan is destined to break into civil war after the coalition forces withdraw in 2014.⁵⁶ The US efforts to train and empower the Afghan National Army have not been promising thus far. The Afghan forces continue to suffer from deserters and infiltrators, and Pakistan does not believe they will be capable

of protecting their side of the border.⁵⁷ To encourage Pakistan to abandon perceived future assets, the US must acknowledge that all nations act in what they believe to be as their best interest. An equal or better incentive must be offered to offset the loss of Haqqani protections along their western border. Pledging billions of dollars in aid has already been proven as an inadequate carrot, and may even be rejected in the future as a political gesture to declare sovereignty from western influence. One well documented and important issue to Pakistan is the disputed territory of Kashmir. Perhaps showing an interest in seeking to resolve Kashmir would be a step in the right direction. This will force the US to decide what is exactly in their own best interests since raising the issue will undoubtedly cause rifts with another ally, India. The US can also influence Pakistan by fulfilling the “high-impact, high visibility infrastructure” goals of the Kerry Lugar Berman aid package.⁵⁸ Despite suffering from two severe floods last year, Pakistan is one of the most arid countries in the world.⁵⁹ Accordingly, construction of megadams would offer immense benefits such as water storage,

⁵³ Lyse Doucet, “Nato urged ‘to do more’ on Afghan-Pakistan border,” BBC, August 6, 2010, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10891034>>.

⁵⁴ Sherry Rehman, “North Waziristan is the Final Frontier,” Times of India, June 13, 2010, <<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-toi/all-that-matters/North-Waziristan-is-the-final-frontier/article-show/6042522.cms>>.

⁵⁵ “North Waziristan operation to be ‘selective’”, Dawn News, June 13, 2010, <<http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/03-north-waziristan-operation-to-be-selective-ss-11>>.


⁵⁶ Shuja Nawaz, “Ungovernable”, American Interest, September 2011, <<http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=1007>>.

⁵⁷ Aryn Baker, “The Unwinnable War,” Time, October 24, 2011, <<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2096817,00.html>>.

⁵⁸ Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Afghanistan and Pakistan regional stabilization strategy,” US Department of State, February 4, 2010, <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf>>.

⁵⁹ “Going with the flow,” Economist, February 11, 2012, <<http://www.economist.com/node/21546883?fsrc=scn/tw/te/ar/goingwiththeflow>>.

flood control and electricity generation. Such projects will ease the suffering of the population and garner long term support for the US-Pakistan partnership.

Since the NATO attack on Pakistani soldiers, the relations between the two allies at their worst. Pakistan has shut down the NATO supply route to Afghanistan and the US is withholding aid to ratchet up pressure on Pakistan. Such reactionary policies are dangerous and only work to cause tension between two countries that would benefit greatly from close partnership in the war on terrorism. Pakistan is well on its way to having the fifth largest population on the globe. Its military might, nuclear arsenal, strategic partnership with China, combined with the presence of extremism ensures a high level of continued interest from the international community. Hence, Pakistan's future course will remain vital to the US even after its troops have withdrawn from Afghanistan 

Siloviki Syndicalists

By Frederick S. Schultz

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a power vacuum in the international system and forced a realignment of world powers in which the United States assumed the role of, to quote strategist Colin Gray, the “sheriff of world order.”¹ Gray’s commentary is based on the U.S. monopoly over conventional military power. However, as this paper will demonstrate, the unique nexus of former members of the Soviet security services, political and business elite, and organized crime has served as an effective tool which post-Soviet Russia uses to implement its foreign policy objectives in place of kinetic military force. The failed attempt by U.S. policymakers, in particular the economist Jeffrey Sachs, to implement an Anglo-American style of economy during the early years of the Russian Federation (RF), has led to the reemergence of members of the security services into government, known as the *siloviki* or “strong men.” Vladimir Putin came forth from the shadows of the security services to lead a resurgent Russia, bolstered by high-oil prices and ever expanding commodity exports which benefits Russia’s economic and political standing. The belief that the United States could transform

¹ Colin S. Gray, “Maintaining Effective Deterrence,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, August, 2003). < <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=211>>

Russia's value systems through the time-honored Wilsonian notion of American exceptionalism was by and large a failure. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explained the realities U.S. foreign policy makers would face in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse:

Students of geopolitics and history are uneasy about the single-mindedness of this approach [an attempt to shock the Russian system into a purely democratic and market-oriented state]. They fear that, in overestimating America's ability to shape Russia's internal evolution, America may involve itself needlessly in internal Russian controversies, generate a nationalist backlash, and neglect the usual tasks of foreign policy. They would support a policy designed to modify Russia's traditional truculence and would for that reason favor economic aid and cooperative projects on global issues. They would argue, however, that Russia, regardless of who governs it, sits astride the territory Halford Mackinder called the geopolitical heartland, and is heir to one of the most potent imperial traditions. Even were the postulated moral transformation to occur, it would take time, and in that interlude America should hedge its bets.²

Gray and Kissinger were correct. The fact that both were right underscores the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community vis-à-vis the Russian Federation in the twenty-first century. American conventional military supremacy and Russia's subsequent economic and political

decline led to systematic hubris among policymakers in Washington. The intelligence resources appropriated towards Russia are disproportionately outlaid toward the old cold war threats of conventional and strategic military capabilities. Of course, nation-states must appropriate funds to the monitoring and collection of data regarding the strategic capabilities of a country like Russia. Furthermore, Russian military planners must rely more on their strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the face of Russia's declining conventional forces.³ Strategic and conventional issues transcend the cold war, but this paper will demonstrate that more dangerous threats to U.S. and European security have emerged from Russia which will require different responses from the U.S. intelligence community.

Kissinger's commentary rings true. A new Russia is growing in influence globally and in particular within the former-Soviet Union and Europe. Russian influence today is not wielded through military might, but through economic ties and the direct and indirect networks of former or current members of the Soviet and or Russian security apparatuses, organized crime, and a business class with intimate links with one or both of these groups. Former CIA analyst Mark Lowenthal accurately describes the more potent threat in the present era: "One of the striking challenges of the post-cold war period is the decreased emphasis on military power and the increased emphasis on eco-

² Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 814

³ Daniel Goure, "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces and Arms Control: Déjà vu All over Again" in Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz eds. *The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald* (Carlisle, PA; Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), p.305.

conomic power.”⁴These networks or nexuses operate independently or in unison to promote their own individual interests, and the interest of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. These nexuses have expanded to include foreign government officials, former or current members of foreign intelligence services, foreign businessmen and other professionals, and a panoply of influential private citizens stretching from Kyiv to London and even Washington, DC. These links are often murky and the intentions of the players involved are, at times, difficult to determine. These links and nexuses pose a greater threat to U.S. national security and the security of U.S. allies than Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal. The U.S. intelligence community is faced with the task of penetrating these nexuses, which were formed in the closed society of the USSR and gradually exported to other countries as the Soviet Union liberalized and then collapsed. Economic globalization, free trade agreements, and decreased travel restrictions have produced the unintended consequences of an environment where nexuses flourish. For the purposes of this paper, a nexus will be defined as follows:

“A relationship between two or more individual actors who are acting on behalf of their own interest, the interest of a sovereign nation state, or a non-state actor (e.g., a corporate or criminal entity). The motivations or intentions of the actors within the nexus may be multi-faceted as they may simultaneously represent the interests of one or many of the entities in question.”

⁴ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 4th Ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), p.242.

The U.S. intelligence community should develop more robust human intelligence (HUMINT) and financial intelligence (FININT) capabilities to deal with the threat of these nexuses. Furthermore, the concept of “strategic counterintelligence” should be developed in order to combat the threat on the soil of foreign powers before the threat penetrate the U.S. homeland.⁵

The concept of strategic counterintelligence can be implemented by attacking the nexuses in the offshore financial centers (OFCs) in which nexuses operate by utilizing specific legal mechanisms available to victims of fraud and money laundering. The paradox presented to the nexuses is that they must deposit or title their holdings in jurisdictions which not only possess strict banking secrecy laws, but also uphold disclosure orders and freezing orders unique to many of these jurisdictions which allow victims or potential victims to terminate the nexuses in the offshore jurisdiction before the monies can be funneled into another country’s economy. Overt and covert investigations should be used in conjunction with the implementation of these legal proceedings. The ability to combat nexuses presents the intelligence community with the opportunity for combining forces with private intelligence and legal specialists to protect the interests of the United States. Ironically, a nexus of the forces for good is necessary in order to defeat the post-Soviet nexus which aims to undermine the rule of law and the

⁵ For more on the concept of strategic intelligence see: Michelle Van Cleave, “Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What Should We Do About It?” *Studies in Intelligence* Vol. 51, No. 2 (2007)

integrity of Western financial systems. In short, you need a nexus to defeat a nexus.

Historical Background

It is important to remember that the Bolsheviks executed a coup d'état of the provisional government in the fall of 1917. This was not a groundswell revolution as many historians have suggested. Lenin kept intact many of the bureaucratic organs of the state immediately after his ascendancy to power including the secret police. The dreaded Tsarist Okhrana of Vyacheslav von Plehve became the Cheka of Felix Dzerzhinsky. Historian Richard Pipes suggests that the Bolsheviks learned how to use the secret police to suppress dissent from their Tsarist oppressors.

The people who came to power in Russia in October 1917 had grown up under the regime of 'Extraordinary' and 'Temporary' Laws: this was the only Russian constitution that they had ever known. All of them had been shadowed, searched, arrested, kept in jail, and sentenced to exile by the political police of the imperial government.⁶

In a more precise criticism of the evolution of the Russian secret police, former CIA analyst and Russian historian Jack Dziak claims that the Cheka and its future tributaries (i.e., the GPU, NKVD, OGPU, GUGB, NKGB, MGB, and KGB) shared more with the "pre-Petrine tradition of Muscovy, Ivan the Terrible and his *Oprichnina*, than it did to the relatively ineffectual Okhrana and the

weakened autocracy it inadequately served."⁷

In regard to the analysis of the historical ties between the Russian security services and organized criminal activities, Dziak notes the existence of ties between Josef Stalin and his eventual NKVD chief, Lavrentiy Beria, to criminal organizations in the pre-Soviet Caucasus (Stalin was famous for his banditry before and after he became politically active) and the Okhrana.⁸ In short, the example of the young Beria and Stalin serving as sometime criminals, sometime Okhrana informants in their native Caucasus mirrors the nexus of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and criminal organizations (COs) of the present day. The Soviet system was corrupt and dehumanizing, lacking an ideological foundation other than continued nebulous references to socialism or communism before and after the Second World War. Since the ideological rhetoric was hollow and did not lead to concrete actions, the USSR experienced a form of inverted Marxism which benefited the ruling *nomenklatura* (political elite) and members of the power ministries (security services and the military). In addition to the visible beneficiaries of the Soviet system, organized crime which was active in Tsarist Russia reemerged as a powerful force after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. Criminal organizations flourished in the power vacuum left after Stalin's death. It is difficult to pin-point at what time organized crime became intertwined with the Soviet state, but a substan-

⁶ Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p.317

⁷ John J. Dziak *Chekisty: A History of the KGB* (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1988), p.7

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.8

tial body of evidence suggests that the network of organized crime, the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (KGB), and *nomenklatura* increased dramatically with the ascendancy of Leonid I. Brezhnev to the position of General Secretary (1964-1982). Russian organized crime expert Yuriy Voronin accurately describes the socioeconomic situation during the last three years of the Soviet Union's existence in which the hollow promises of socialist utopia became visibly obsolete even if criticism of the government's economic and social policies could only take place in the form of *samizdat* (anti-regime writings passed covertly among political activists). "Organized crime in Russia took root in the fertile irrationalities of a planned economy and prospered in the vast black and gray markets that emerged in the last three decades of Communist rule."⁹ The COs, imprisoned by the NKVD under Stalin suddenly became covertly allied with the security apparatus from Khrushchev until the Soviet Union's collapse. The one exception to the increase in the nexus of COs and the security services took place under the leadership of Yuriy V. Andropov (1983-1984), who openly attacked this relationship when he fired the head of the MVD (Ministry of the Interior) Nikolai A. Shchelokov and demoted Brezhnev's son-in-law Lt. Gen. Yuri M. Churbanov for allegedly taking bribes from organized crime groups.¹⁰ The relationship between the security services, ruling po-

litical elite, and COs did not end with the hammer and sickle being replaced by the tricolor flag of the Russian Federation in 1991.

Patricia Rawlinson has described the relationship between organized crime and legitimate structure (i.e., the recognized governing authority) as the "Chameleon Syndrome." This label is appropriate as it reflects "the ability of organized crime, through its interaction with legitimate structures, to merge with and eventually play the proactive role in the Russian state."¹¹ Rawlinson demonstrates (see Figures 1a and 2b) the historical development of COs and the Russian state from the Tsarist period through the late Yeltsin period in juxtaposition to the criminal nexus of legitimate and illegitimate structures. Absent from Rawlinson's analysis is the specific relationship between the COs and the KGB/FSB. If we include this in our analysis, then the foundations of the nexus are evident. The Chameleon Syndrome, for the purposes of this paper, will be viewed as a model which has been exported through multiple sources and now operates on behalf of the nexuses. This exported model is the target for the U.S. intelligence community. The nexus is the web woven between legitimate and illegitimate structures, which are able to adversely affect U.S. interests and U.S. national security imperatives. Lowenthal points out that the post-Soviet transformation of the intelligence services are not reforms at all, but a metamorphosis into a

⁹ Yuriy A. Voronin, "The Emerging Criminal State: Economic and Political Aspects of Organized Crime in Russia" in Phil Williams ed. *Russian Organized Crime: The New Threat?* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p.55

¹⁰ "Under Andropov, Policeman's Lot Isn't Happy One," John F. Burns, *New York Times*, August 14, 1983

¹¹ Patricia Rawlinson, "Russian Organized Crime: A Brief History" in Phil Williams ed., *Russian Organized Crime*, p.29; For a more complete study of the Chameleon Syndrome see Patricia Rawlinson, *Hunting the Chameleon: the problems of identifying Russian Organized Crime* (London: University of London Press, 1998)

subtle role conducive to a Russia which allows for a relatively free-flow of foreign citizens.

The SVR [*Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki* which was formerly the KGB's First Chief Directorate responsible for es-

pionage] made much of the fact that it has reduced its overseas presence, attempting to portray itself as a more benign organization than its predecessor. Some observers believe this may have been largely cosmetic. Russia is now more open and accessible than was the Soviet Union, making it easier for the SVR to have contacts with agents in Russia instead of overseas. However, both Britain and Germany have reported the presence of large numbers of

Russian spies. MI5 director Evans said there had been no decrease in 'undeclared Russian intelligence officers in the U.K.,' and that their activities and those of the Chinese diverted resources from efforts against al-Qaeda. Similarly, the head of Germany's domestic intelligence service [Bundesa-

mt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV)- Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution] said that one third of all Russian diplomats in Germany (120 out of 360) were part of the SVR, working against

a broad range of topics.¹²

The 'Active Assimilative' and 'Proactive' roles played between legitimate and illegitimate structures within the international system are most appropriate for analyzing the nexus target. This late stage development represents the utilization of foreign (i.e., outside of the Russian Federation) structures to promote the goals of the nexuses. Nexuses attempt to manipulate the grey areas between legitimate and quasi-legitimate

FIGURE 1a
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGITIMATE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN RUSSIA

Bandits, Pugachev, etc. Vory v zokone (I) (Less sophisticated gangs, teenage groups)	REACTIVE	Tsarist autocracy Soviet totalitarianism
Vanka Kain War of bitches (1940s) Vory v zakone (II) Black market- tsekhoviki Early 1970s	PASSIVE ASSIMILATIVE	Tsarist autocracy Soviet totalitarianism Quasi-totalitarianism
Growth of shadow economy Tsekhoviki increase in economic base Mass money laundering into new economic ventures cooperatives, joint ventures	ACTIVE ASSIMILATIVE	Nepotism and mass corruption in Central Asian republics (late 1970s). Slowing down economic growth. Perestroika Democratization
Active role in privatization Foreign business contracts Political figures bought Media manipulation Infiltration into banking	PROACTIVE	End of Gorbachev era 1991 August coup Yeltsin and 'new' Russia

economic structures (see Appendix 2b 'Active Assimilative'). The legitimate structures under assault may include the Western media, financial systems, capital markets, and legal systems, first

12 Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, p.326. See footnote 4.

among which are located in OFCs.

Economic globalization, through its reliance upon cheap transportation and telecommunications, has created an environment in which nexuses thrive. Global free trade agreements have

doubled global GDP since the early 1990s, but as economist Moises Naim points out, in the same period worldwide money-laundering has increase nearly fifteen fold.¹³ Offshore financial havens such as the Channel Islands, Cyprus, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Mauritius, and Marshall Islands, not to mention

traditional financial centers in Switzerland, Austria, and Li-

¹³ Moises Naim, "It's the Illicit Economy, Stupid," Foreign Policy No. 151 (November/December, 2005)

¹⁴ The term *Money Laundering* (ML) is defined as follows: The funneling of the monetary proceeds of crime through the financial system so as to cover the source of the ill-gotten gain. ML is a three stage process consisting of "placement," "layering," and "integration." Placement consists

to properties and corporations. Often monies titled or vaulted in OFCs are acquired fraudulently. Furthermore, numerous double-taxation treaties developed between OFCs, such as that between Cyprus and the USSR, for the purpose

of acquiring foreign currency and developing financial ties to Western Europe, are now utilized to support the nexuses. Arcane, Soviet-era double-taxation treaties have stunted economic productivity in many of the USSR's successor states including Ukraine. "The nation's [Ukraine] oligarchs and loyal political elite continue to profit from these

FIGURE 2b
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGITIMATE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN RUSSIA

Bandits, teenage groups No desire or ability to negotiate and break into the legitimate structures	REACTIVE	Usually strong. Political and economic stability. No need to negotiate.
Integration into legitimate structures, usually as informant or low level bribery. Restricted level of money laundering	ACTIVE ASSIMILATIVE	Subtle weakening of structures, e.g. economic slump, law enforcement not in full control. Prepared to negotiate on prescribed terms.
Integration now more controlled. Bribery moves into higher level of legit structures. Money-laundering widespread Active and significant participation in legit economy	PASSIVE ASSIMILATIVE	Political and economic structures significantly weakened Power vacuums. Grey areas between legit and illegit increase. Negotiating strength on a par with organized crime.
Significant control of legit structures, particularly economic and law enforcement. Manipulation in politics	PROACTIVE	Anomie Acquiescence replaces negotiation.

of the initial introduction of funds into the financial system. In the layering phase, the launderer engages in a series of conversions or movements of the funds to distance them from their source for instance through the purchase or sale of investment instruments. Finally, the funds are integrated into the legitimate economy through the purchase of properties or investments. For a more complete definition see the Financial Action Task Force explanation of ML at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,3746,en_32250379_32235720_33659613_1_1_1_1,00.html Accessed on 26 October 2011. The criminal definition of ML in the United States is defined by 18 U.S.C. §1956

sweet tax deals at the nation's expense," writes reporter Graham Stack.¹⁵ Stack continues:

Transfer pricing means that subsidiaries belonging to one international holding skew the prices they charge each other so that company profit is realized where tax is least—invariably a tax haven. Offshore shareholders use thin capitalization schemes to provide funding to their onshore companies in the form of loans instead of equity. The onshore company's debt can thus exceed its actual capitalization many times over, hence the term.

The point is that the company then pays interest to shareholders on these outsize loans, instead of declaring profits. Interest is tax deductible for the company in Ukraine and exempt from tax for the offshore shareholder under the terms of the Cyprus double taxation treaty.¹⁶

The end result of such an operation is the capture of the state by private interest by their depriving the state of legitimate tax revenue while distributing ill-gotten gains through political patronage. It is important to remember that nexuses are most successful when they do not break the law but simply manipulate existing laws to their own benefit. Furthermore, the nexus may serve to bolster an individual's net worth while creating a favorable economic environment in another state where the Kremlin could implement its foreign policy through state-controlled multi-national corporations. Just such a case will be discussed in the example of the gas trading company RosUkrEn-

ergo.

Nexuses thrive in the different shades of grey made possible by the interaction of different legal traditions and cultures. Many of the figures examined in this paper employ Western public relations firms and legal experts before ever considering participating in intrigue or assassination. Although not immune to utilizing *chyernaya rabota* (black operations), to quote I.V. Stalin, such as in the case of the mysterious murder of former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko¹⁷, nexuses prefer to operate through benign mediums of subversion. It is instructive to remember, as far as cross-cultural analysis is concerned, what seems highly irrational to a United States citizen, may be perfectly rational to Vladimir Putin in understanding the role of corruption in society in conjunction with the rule of law.

The opacity of the nexuses outlined in this study makes documented resources difficult to uncover. However, the relationships between the forementioned players within the context of the Russia-European natural gas trade provides an example of how the nexus operates to achieve multiple strategic goals. The relationship between former *Stasi* captain Mathias Warnig and former KGB Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Putin is an example of a nexus *par excellence*, as this relationship has

¹⁵ Graham Stack "High Price of Havens," *Kyiv Post* July 29, 2010
¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Litvinenko died by poisoning in November 2006, after consuming a fatal dosage of Polonium 210 which was allegedly given to him by former FSB agent Andrei Lugovoi after the two met in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel in London. Litvinenko had allegedly fallen out of favor with President Vladimir Putin after deciding to work for the oligarch Boris Berezovsky. For a summary of the Litvinenko affair see Chapter 10, "Murder Inc." in Mark Hollingsworth and Stewart Lansley *Londongrad: From Russia With Cash; The Inside Story of the Oligarchs* (London: Fourth Estate, 2009)

served as the pivot in energy diplomacy between Russia and Germany.¹⁸ This nexus began when the men were working together in East Germany during the 1990s and continues to linger. Warnig has played a major role in the development of the Nord Stream gas pipeline which traverses the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany.¹⁹ Scholar Marshall Goldman summarizes the Putin-Warnig nexus:

“...Matthias Warnig was appointed managing director of Nord Stream, the company that would build and operate the pipeline. Warnig, who at the time was board chairman of the Russian branch of Dresdner Bank, had worked with Putin in East Germany during the 1980s when both were intelligence agents: Warnig a captain in the Stasi, the East German Secret Police (or the East German Ministry of Foreign Trade, as his official biography describes it), and Putin a Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB. Their paths crossed again in St. Petersburg when Putin was put charge of the mayor’s [Anatoly Sobchak] office for foreign economic relations. Warnig negotiated with Putin for an operating license in St. Petersburg for Dresdner Bank, and it became the first foreign bank to receive such permission to operate in St. Petersburg.”²⁰

Simply stating the obvious about the Putin-Warnig relationship would leave this study incomplete. More interesting is the relationship and goals of the nexuses which take place within the gas trade between Vladimir Putin and other

siloviki, Gazprom, the Semion Mogilevich Crime Group (SMCG), oligarchs, and the government of Ukraine through the shadowy gas trading intermediary known as RosUkrEnergo (RUE). The RUE case demonstrates how the nexuses utilize offshore financial centers to pursue their own interests independently and in alliance with Kremlin policy.

Case Study: RosUkrEnergo

Vladimir Putin and the Semion Mogilevich Crime Group

The use of natural gas as an instrument of Russian foreign policy is well known to students of geopolitics. “With its natural gas and oil pipelines that tie Europe to Russia like an umbilical cord, Russia has unchecked powers and influence that in a real sense exceed the military power and influence it had in the Cold War.”²¹

RosUkrEnergo (RUE) is a gas trading company and has been registered in the Swiss city of Zug since July 22, 2004. It served as an intermediary trading firm, supplying natural gas from Central Asia via the Gazprom-owned pipeline network to Ukraine’s state-owned gas company Naftohaz. The creation of RUE was announced in July 2004, during a meeting in Yalta between Russian president Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kuchma, as the ostensibly “transparent” replacement for Eural Trans Gas (ETG), which had been serving as the intermediary since late 2002.²²

18 “Report Links Putin to Dresdner,” *The St. Petersburg Times* Tuesday, March 1, 2005. < http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=2858>

19 For more on Matthias Warnig’s role in the Nord Stream pipeline project see: Hans Martin-Tillack “A tale of gazoviki, money and greed,” *Stern* September 13, 2007

20 Marshall I. Goldman, *Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 158-159

21 *Ibid.*, p.15

22 The owner of ETG was Dmytro Firtash who, according to researcher Roman Kupchinsky, “had little known assets” when he established the company yet “received \$300 million in credits from Russian banks in 2003.” See Roman Kupchinsky, “Gazprom’s European Web” *The Jamestown Foundation*, February, 2009, p. 5-6. For a precise history of ETG and its role in the Turkmenistan-Russian-Ukrainian gas trade see: “It’s a Gas: funny

The owner of ETG, Dmytro Firtash, has close links to the “don of dons” of the Russian mafia, Semion Mogilevich.²³ Firtash turned out to be the owner of 45 percent of RUE so the switch in intermediaries by presidents Putin and Kuchma and their claim that this would bring any sort of change flies in the face of the fact that none of the ETG interests were displaced by the creation of RUE.

The FBI’s Intelligence Section issued an extensive report on the Semion Mogilevich Organization in August, 1998. The reports states: “The corruptive influence of the Mogilevich Organization apparently extends to the Russian security services and top-level government officials.”²⁴

The report also links Mogilevich to the Italian Comorra and New York-based Genovese La Cosa Nostra.²⁵ Mogilevich is currently on the FBI’s Most Wanted list for defrauding shareholders YBM Magnex, a Pennsylvania-based firm, of \$150 million. The federal indictment of Mogilevich and co-defendants Igor Fisherman, Jacob Bogatin, and Anatoly Tsoura, states that they “implemented the scheme to defraud using companies and bank accounts in over twenty different countries, in-

cluding offshore locations such as the Republic of Nauru in the South Pacific, the Cayman Islands, and Nevis in the Caribbean, as well as Canada, England, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia, in order to make it more difficult for law enforcement authorities, securities regulators, as well as YBM Magnex’s auditors and forensic examiners, to uncover the true nature of their criminal operations.”²⁶ President Obama mentioned Mogilevich in his *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, released in July 2011.

Semion Mogilevich is wanted by the United States for fraud, racketeering, and money laundering and was recently added to the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted fugitives list. Mogilevich and several members of his criminal organization were charged in 2003 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a 45-count racketeering indictment with involvement in a sophisticated securities fraud and money-laundering scheme, in which they allegedly used a Pennsylvania company, YBM Magnex, to defraud investors of more than \$150 million. Even after that indictment and being placed on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list Mogilevich has continued to expand his criminal empire. Mogilevich was arrested by Russian police on tax charges in January 2008 and was released pending trial in July 2009. Other members of his organization remain at large.²⁷

The necessity for a company such as RUE is negligible as the price of Central Asian gas is

business in the Turkmen-Ukrainian Gas Trade” *Global Witness* April, 2006.

²³ In December, 2002, then U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual warned the Ukrainian government about the Firtash-Mogilevich link. “In December 2002, just a few months ago, Ukraine signed several agreements that increased Gazprom’s control over NAK Naftog[h]az and its activities. Itera [also a Russian gas trading company with a U.S. office in Jacksonville, Florida], seen by many as a Gazprom competitor, was pushed out of the Ukrainian market and substituted for a new Gazprom intermediary, Eural Trans Gas. According to press accounts, Eural Trans Gas was registered in Hungary the day before the contract was signed with just \$12,000 in charter capital. In addition, media reports link Eural Trans Gas with organized crime figure Semion Mogilevich, who was recently indicted in the United States.” Speech by Ambassador Pascual, May 23, 2003. As cited in Kupchinsky, *Gazprom*, p.6

²⁴ Semion Mogilevich Organization, *Eurasian Organized Crime*, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared by the Intelligence Section, Organizational Intelligence Unit (August, 1998), p.34

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.31, 33

²⁶ United States of America v. Semion Mogilevich; Igor Fisherman; Jacob Bogatin; Anatoly Tsoura Criminal No. 02-157 (A), (30), (d), p. 15-16

²⁷ The President of the United States, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* (Washington, DC, July, 2011), p.21

negotiated directly between Gazprom and the governments of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan without the help of RUE, a company that does not own any gas production facilities or pipelines and is therefore unable to influence negotiations.²⁸ Given the fact that Gazprom is not only a monopolist supplier to Ukraine but also a monopsonist²⁹ purchaser of Central Asian gas, one is forced to ponder the question why one state owned company, Gazprom, needs an intermediary company with no pipeline infrastructure to sell gas to Ukraine's state-owned firm Naftohaz. The answer to this riddle cuts directly to the goal of the nexuses that operate RUE. RUE serves the foreign policy goals of the Kremlin, which seeks to draw, in this case Ukraine, but also other post-Soviet states, back into Russia's sphere of influence. Energy supplies are used to coerce and manipulate these states into adopting more malleable policies towards Russia regarding a variety of issues including the rejection of NATO enlargement, continuance of Russian military installations on the foreign state's soil (e.g., the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Ukraine) and subjugation of these states' policy-making apparatuses to the will of Moscow.³⁰ In Ukraine and Belarus, the fact that the ethnic and linguistic make-up of their populations is similar to Russia's (largely Orthodox Christian

Slavs) makes them the immediate target of a Russia faced with a looming demographic disaster should Russia not be able to co-opt states like Ukraine back into the proverbial "overlordship of Muscovy."³¹

The manipulation of energy resources in the trading relationships between energy rich countries such as Russia and energy poor ones such as Ukraine and Belarus produce 'rents of dependency'³² which in turn allow private citizens to capture state power through the monies acquired fraudulently in the natural gas trade. Eventually, these rents, which are almost always gathered through some sort of fraudulent relationship, are used to coerce the state into formulating policy based on the interests of the elites which control the relationship. In short, the private citizens grow richer in exchange for monies funneled to politicians who in the case of Ukraine produce policies favorable to Moscow.³³ These policies include the extension of the lease of the port

31 Nicholas Eberstadt and Aproova Shah, "Russia's Demographic Disaster" American Enterprise Institute, May, 2009. <<http://www.aei.org/article/society-and-culture/citizenship/russias-demographic-disaster/>>

32 The phrase "rents of energy dependency" is taken from numerous literatures composed by Margarita M. Balmaceda and is defined as follows: "By rents of energy dependency we are referring to whatever unearned benefits an economic group within a country (or, for that matter, a regime or a country as a whole) may receive from the continuation of energy dependency relationships, especially with longstanding partners, in this case Russia. Such rents of dependency can take a variety of forms: from, on the one hand, the subsidy effect experienced by a whole economy (such as in the case of Belarus) to, on the other the concrete benefits received by specific economic groups. Legal, semi-legal, or illegal businesses with privileged access to insider information and political networks have been able to take advantage of the profitable arbitrage possibilities created by a situation in which the energy market has not been liberalized and where differences between domestic, "near abroad" and export prices continue to be significant despite the gradual move toward market based trade relations. See, for instance, Margarita M. Balmaceda, *Energy Dependency*, p. 9

33 John Marone, "Sovereign Surrender" Kyiv Post, May 7, 2010. <<http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/66019/>>; See also, Frederick Schultz, "Target Ukraine: How the issues of Fuel, Fraud, and the Fleet threaten the independence of Russia's neighbor," *The Officer*, October-November, 2010

28 Kupchinsky, *Gazprom*, p.7. See footnote 25.

29 The term 'monopsonist' is used to describe Gazprom's relationship as the sole purchaser of Turkmenistan's natural gas. For more, see Margarita M. Balmaceda, *Energy Dependency, Politics and Corruption in the Former Soviet Union: Russia's power, oligarchs' profits and Ukraine's missing energy policy, 1995-2006* (New York: Routledge, 2008), p.3-4

30 Paul Goble, "Ukraine's Options to Counter Russia are Limited" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty September 23, 2009. <http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukraines_Options_To_Counter_Russia_Are_Limited/1829268.html>

facilities in Sevastopol to the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) from 2017 until 2042 made by the current government of Viktor Yanukovich in exchange for a mythical natural gas discount which had been previously agreed to by then (January, 2009) prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who is now imprisoned by Ukrainian authorities.³⁴ Furthermore, the Yanukovich government also ceded to the Kremlin's request to allow for the basing of Russian FSB officers in Sevastopol.³⁵ Former Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) chief Valentyn Nalyvaychenko explicitly stated why the return of the FSB to the Crimea would have a negative impact on Ukraine. "Russian counter-intelligence have undertaken on our territory unfriendly actions, including the covert collection of, and steps towards, collecting secret information and thereby infringing the Criminal Code of Ukraine."³⁶ The surrender of the Ukrainian basing facilities for an additional 25-30 years and the redeployment of the FSB to the Crimea represent the end result of the Kremlin's use of natural gas as a political weapon. The numerous instances of supply termination by Gazprom, through RUE, to Ukraine and subsequently the Central and Western European consumers has created the conditions for long-term political concessions to be made by Ukraine to

³⁴ Edward Chow describes the Tymoshenko agreement of January 2009 as follows: "One of the fundamental flaws of the January 19, 2009, as sale and purchase agreement is that it set too high a base price for Russian gas to Ukraine. The \$330 per 1,000 cubic meter price we are told Ukraine would have had to pay for Russian gas this quarter is higher than the Russian gas sale price to Western Europe today (April 22, 2010). . . . The '30 percent discount' of 2010 [Yanukovich agreement] is just as phony as the '20 percent discount' of 2009." See Edward Chow, "Bad deal all around" *Kyiv Post* April 22, 2010. <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/64766/>

³⁵ Taras Kuzio, "The FSB Returns to Ukraine" May 24, 2010. <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36411 >

³⁶ Ibid.

Russia. This created a pipeline "pincer movement" in which European consumers like Germany applied diplomatic pressure on Ukraine while the Kremlin-Gazprom axis applies pressure from the supply side of the ledger.

Although Tymoshenko successfully terminated the relationship between RUE Gazprom and Naftohaz in 2009, her motivations for doing so appear to be motivated by political considerations in undercutting Mr. Firtash and his support to Yanukovich's Party of Regions. Tymoshenko, who hails from the same city as Mogilevich, Dnepropetrovsk, only entered politics after her gas trading business, United Energy Systems of Ukraine (UESU), was deprived of political patronage in the wake of the fall and subsequent arrest in the United States of her one-time business partner and former Prime Minister, Pavlo Lazarenko. Under Tymoshenko's watch, UESU wired \$120 million to Lazarenko's offshore accounts in Switzerland and Antigua.³⁷ Lazarenko was convicted in the United States of mail fraud and money laundering as a result of transferring monies made in the gas trade to banking accounts in the U.S. Lazarenko was found guilty in U.S. Federal Court in the Northern District of California and Ms. Tymoshenko, often lauded in the U.S. media as a stalwart of supporter of democracy, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in the case.³⁸ Ms. Tymoshenko refused to

³⁷ Matthew Kaminski, "The Rise and Fall of Yulia Tymoshenko," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 24, 2011. <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203914304576629001126377580.html>>

³⁸ *United States of America v. Pavel Lazarenko* Supplemental Motion in *Limine* to Admit Statements of Yulia Tymoshenko as Co-conspirator United States District Court Northern District of California San Francisco Division, March 30, 2004

cooperate with the U.S. Department of Justice. Tymoshenko has been praised as the individual who finally terminated the role of RUE as part of the January 19, 2009 gas agreement (see above). This act certainly had a short-lived negative effect on the business interests of Dmytro Firtash and his backer Semion Mogilevich, but did this serve the interests of Tymoshenko's political career? Former SBU (Ukrainian Intelligence Service) officer Nalyvaychenko claims that Tymoshenko ordered his predecessor Oleksandr Turchynov to destroy a top secret dossier on Semion Mogilevich that linked him to past business dealings with Tymoshenko.³⁹ Was Tymoshenko concerned with the possibility of *kompromat* (blackmail) in light of the fact that she fully intended to seek the presidency after her political marriage with President Viktor Yushchenko ended in a bitter divorce?

Vladimir Putin is also alleged to be linked to Mogilevich. Mykola Melnychenko, a member of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's security detail, taped a conversation February 8, 2000 between then SBU chief Leonid Derkach and President Kuchma which suggested Putin and Mogilevich have known each other since Putin lived and worked in St. Petersburg.

Kuchma: "Have you found Mogilevich?"

Derkach: "I found him."

Kuchma: "So, are you two working now?"

Derkach: "We're working. We have another meeting tomorrow. He arrives incognito."

Later in the discussion Derkach revealed a few de-

tails about Mogilevich.

Derkach: "He's on good terms with Putin. He and Putin have been in contact since Putin was still in Leningrad."⁴⁰

Kuchma: "I hope we won't have any problems because of this."⁴¹

Unconfirmed reports linked Putin to Mogilevich through the late Roman Tsepov, whom Putin knew since he worked in St. Petersburg with Mayor Anatoly Sobchak's office. Tsepov's firm, Baltik-Eskort, provided security for Sobchak and Putin.⁴² Tsepov was murdered by poison around September 24, 2004 and, as journalist Charles Gurin notes, the fact that Tsepov was representing himself as an ally of President Putin may have led to his demise.

Moskovskiye Novosti reported in July that Tsepov had presented himself to Yukos shareholders as essentially having been commissioned by Sechin [Igor Sechin is a former GRU officer and was Putin's Presidential Chief of Staff], Zolotov [Viktor Zolotov worked for Baltik-Eskort and served as head of President Putin's security service], and even Putin to "come to terms" with the embattled oil company. "As soon as the 'Kremlin representative' asked for a big advance on his services, his powers were called into question. Tsepov's former relationship with Zolotov and Sechin

⁴⁰ Leningrad changed its name to St. Petersburg shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

⁴¹ Roman Kupchinsky, "The Strange Ties between Semion Mogilevich and Vladimir Putin," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Vol. 6 No. 57 March 25, 2009. <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34753>

⁴² Charles Gurin, "Roman Tsepov, R.I.P.," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Volume: 1 No. 93 September 26, 2004. <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26907>

³⁹ "Nalyvaychenko, Former SBU chief, talks about corruption, shady gas trade, Gongadze murder" *Kyiv Post*, December 10, 2010. <<http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/92518/>>.

and possibly also with Putin is a hard fact, but the level and quality of his present-day contacts are, basically, a matter of speculation” (*Moskovskiy Novosti*, July 9).⁴³

It is clear that Mogilevich is connected at the highest levels of the Russian government. After being arrested in January, 2008 in Moscow on tax evasion charges along with Vladimir Nekrasov in relation to their cosmetic business Arbat-Prestige, Mogilevich was released without comment around July of 2009.⁴⁴

It is clear that the SMCG has now assumed a ‘proactive’ role, to quote Rawlinson (See Figures 1a and 2b) in relationship to the Russian and Ukrainian governments. Evidence suggests that Mogilevich not only wields tremendous influence in his native Ukraine, but also at the highest policy-making levels of the Russian Federation (see above). Dmytro Firtash’s monies made through ETG and later RUE were sources of financial support for the Party of Regions and President Viktor Yanukovich. Mogilevich established ties to Firtash through offshore financial companies (see below), and the policy prescriptions of the Yanukovich regime are lock-step with the Kremlin’s desire to co-opt Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence. The unsolved question is how U.S. intelligence services can target intermediaries like RUE, the epicenter of the nexus, and counteract their destructive influence in a country like Ukraine. First, we must diagnose the nexus of RUE and see

what weapons are available to the U.S. and its allies in order to counteract these murky structures and the players involved with them.

RosUkrEnergo’s Offshore Web

RUE was to be an equal partnership with fifty-percent owned by Gazprom through its affiliate Gazprombank and the Ukrainian side managed by Austria’s Raiffeisen Zentral Bank (RZB). RUE initially had two co-directors. Konstantin Chuychenko, a former KGB officer and head of Gazprom’s legal department, represented the Russian side of RUE.⁴⁵ Oleg Palchykov was the former director of the ETG office in Moscow and represented the hidden owners of RUE (the Ukrainian side) owned by RZB through the Viennese-registered company Centragas.⁴⁶ Interestingly, at the time Palchykov represented ETG, he was also the Moscow representative of Highrock Properties, Elmstad, and Lindown.⁴⁷ Highrock Properties was of particular interest because its Board of Directors includes Igor Fisherman who is wanted by the FBI in connection with the YBM Magnex case (see above) and is described in the indictment as ‘a close associate and top financial advisor to defendant Mogilevich.’⁴⁸ The wives of Mogilevich and Fisherman, Galina Telish and Olga Zunzerova, were also on the board of Highrock. The late journalist Roman Kupchinsky highlights the links

⁴³ *Moskovskiy Novosti* (“Moscow News”) July 9, 2004 as cited in *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ “Mogilevich, Nekrasov Charged,” *Moscow Times*, January 31, 2008

⁴⁵ Kupchinsky, *Gazprom*, p. 9. See footnote 25.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12. The indictment of Mogilevich and Fisherman regarding YBM Magnex may be read at: <http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ruslobby-mogilevich-04172007.pdf>.

between Highrock, ETG, Firtash, and Telish in the following footnote from his 2009 monograph *Gazprom's European Web*:

A search of Cypriote-registered companies revealed that on December 31, 2000, a company called Agatheas Trading Ltd was registered in Nicosia. On December 28, 2000, the first shareholder of Agatheas became Niki Nicolaou (54A Nicodmou Mylona str, Ayios Nicolaos, Limassol, Cyprus) owning 1,000 shares. That same day Niki Nicolaou was appointed director of the company and Electra Erotocritou, the company secretary. On January 30, 2001, Niki Nicolaou resigned as the director and Galina Telesh (address Veresaeva St. 6-97, Moscow, Russia) was appointed director. Telesh was the wife of Semyon Mogilevich. On January 15, 2001, Firtash changed the name of Highrock Holding to Simia Holdings in Limesol, Cyprus. In the document it is stated that among the shareholders of Simia Holdings was Agatheas Holding with 2,745,000 shares. Agatheas was, at the time, controlled by Galina Telesh, Mogilevich's wife. Two years later, on February 24, 2003, Electra Erotocritou resigned as company secretary of Agatheas and Mittelmeer Secretaries Ltd (10 Doiranis St. Engomi, Nicosia, Cyprus) was appointed to this position. Niki Nicolaou gave her 1,000 shares to Mittelmeer Nominee Ltd. On June 1, 2003, six months after Eural Trans Gas had been active, Telesh resigned and was replaced by Firtash. The Agatheas structure remained intact until July 2007.

⁴⁹Goldman's remarks are more succinct.

The shenanigans of Highrock, RUE, ITERA (the forerunner of Eural Trans Gas), and Gazprom illustrate the skill with which veterans of the black market in the Soviet era have learned to manipulate the market system and obfuscate their operations from even sophisticated investors. How they learned to build such a web of false fronts hidden assets for themselves despite having grown up in a system of relatively simple central planning remains a mystery. Where did they learn such sophisticated schemes?⁹ It was not taught to them in Soviet institutions of higher learning or in Gosplan, the state central planning agency.⁵⁰

It is this Ukrainian "side" of RUE which exemplifies the tentacles of the nexuses between political elites, former KGB like Putin, and leaders of organized crime groups like Mogilevich. Kupchinsky performed excellent research into the web of nameplate companies created to mask the ownerships of the hyper-influential RUE. The web weaves a path from Gazprom and the Ukrainian side (Dmytro Firtash 45% and Ivan Fursin 5%) through numerous name plate companies domiciled in OFCs. RUE, like many gas intermediaries, utilized OFCs in order to hide the ultimate beneficial owners (UBOs) of the organization. Switzerland, Lichtenstein, and Austria were also used to create shell corporations used to mask the UBOs of RUE. The UBOs were masked in order to shield their association with organized crime, in particular Semion Mogilevich.

⁴⁹ Kupchinsky, *Gazprom*, p. 32. See footnote 25.

⁵⁰ Goldman, *Petrostate*, p. 148. See footnote 23.

The Austria connection is of particular interest as Austria's neutrality and non-NATO status made it a favorite playground of the KGB and other Warsaw pact security services during the cold war. Furthermore, Austria has strict banking secrecy laws that allow financial institutions to refuse to disclose the identity of a company's principles. The KGB setup Donau Bank (renamed VTB Bank after the fall of the USSR) and the trading company IMAG (Investment Management and Advisory Group), renamed Dehel GmbH.⁵¹ Andrei Akimov, who once ran Donau Bank, is now chairman of the management Board of Gazprombank which until January 16, 2007 owned 50 percent of RUE (the shares were purchased by Gazprombank's parent company Gazprom).⁵² Not surprisingly, Vienna serves as the base for the largest SVR station in Europe.⁵³

The role jurisdictions that Cyprus and Austria play in allowing nexuses to operate cannot be emphasized enough. Dmytro Firtash, Gazprom, and Mogilevich all use OFCs as the locales for concealing their business dealings through nominee shareholders and other financial shenanigans to influence the policies of decision-makers in East/Central Europe and perhaps even in Western countries such as the United Kingdom.

RUE has made Firtash so wealthy and influential that the CEO of his holding company GroupDF, Robert Shelter-Jones, saw fit to try and gain influence on Firtash's behalf with a high

ranking elected official in the British government. Shelter-Jones funneled £30,000 towards the campaign of UK politician Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones who was slated to become National Security Advisor to Prime Minister David Cameron before MI5 produced a report linking her to both Firtash and oligarch Mikhail Chernoy.⁵⁴

The overall goal of men like Firtash is to make money, but his links to Mogilevich and their link to the Kremlin allow him to be coerced into acting on behalf of other interests. Terminating Firtash's ability to make money and to use OFCs to conceal assets and launder cash is central to solving the problem presented by the nexuses. Individuals like Firtash must be denied access to Western financial markets, in particular those of the United States, at all cost. Staunching the flow of money will terminate the ability of the nexus to operate.

The role OFCs play in masking ownership, providing cover for fraud schemes, and laundering the fruits of the crime must be understood so that: 1) proper intelligence targets may be established (especially third-party facilitators who may be innocent, i.e., a bank); 2) overt and covert operations may proceed to determine link-data-analysis (LDA) between the members of the nexuses; and 3) a legal plan of action may be created to disrupt and terminate the nexus in the OFC. The legal measures must be applicable to the jurisdiction of the OFC in question. Luckily for crime fighters,

⁵¹ Kupchinsky, *Gazprom.*, p.17. See footnote 25.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ "Why Russia's Intelligence Service Needs a New Chief," *Jane's Intelligence Digest*, October 19, 2007 as cited in Ibid.

⁵⁴ "MI5 'vetoed Security Minister over links to Ukrainian oligarchs'," Christopher Leake and Mark Hollingsworth, *Daily Mail*, August 15, 2010. < <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1303215/MI5-vetoed-Security-Minister-Baroness-Pauline-Neville-Jones-links-Ukrainian-oligarchs.html>>

many OFCs, including Cyprus (a holdover from its British colonial tradition) fall under the auspices of English common law. Although OFCs' banking practices vary, most include strict banking secrecy laws and secrecy laws surrounding incorporated entities (referred to as 'name plate corporations' because they do not possess material assets and are used simply to shield the UBO).

Towards a Cooperative Solution: How the Intelligence Community can Dissuade and Deter Nexuses from Achieving their Goals and Objectives

The first step in combating the nexuses discussed above is to encourage the United States intelligence community, in particular the CIA, to develop a more robust HUMINT capability in OFCs and in financial centers such as Vienna and Zurich, but also in locales such as Cyprus, Macao, Mauritius, British Virgin Islands, Channel Islands, and Bermuda just to name a few. Intelligence agents should be well-versed in forensic accounting and understand the respective jurisdictions' laws governing financial institutions. The CIA should work in conjunction with the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to train field operatives to collect relevant financial data on nexuses operating in OFCs. Notwithstanding the issues surrounding personal privacy, Treasury may utilize the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecommunications) to track financial flows and misappropriated funds in order to target and ter-

minate the nexuses' objectives.⁵⁵

In the post-9/11 period, the FBI has understandably shifted its "pendulum of focus" toward combating terrorist activities. In light of the fact that more organized crime groups and terrorist organizations sought to use OFCs to mask the financing of their activities, the FBI would be well-served to deploy more of its capabilities and expertise to a role it has traditionally targeted: combating fraud and money laundering. The necessity for collaboration with CIA, Treasury, the private sector, and international organizations created for the specific purpose of protecting the financial system from unlawful penetration and use cannot be emphasized enough. Therefore, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) should be utilized as the center for interagency collaboration along with the contracting center for private sector participants. ODNI can apportion appropriate funds from each agency to attack the nexuses.

The solution to the problem of nexuses is to attack them in the OFCs which they use to conceal the ownership of fraudulently acquired assets and launder monies to influence peddlers and policymakers in the country they want to coerce. At present nearly 800,000 companies are registered in the British Virgin Islands. A 2006 estimate concluded that at least 50 percent of all currency transactions processed internationally involve OFCs.⁵⁶ In the BVI, as in most other OFCs, the following public information is available about these

⁵⁵ Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, p.259. See footnote 4.

⁵⁶ Offshore Financial Services Information Center, available at: <http://www.bviibc.com/about.htm> as cited in Martin Kenney, "Combating International Fraud," *Mondaq News*, February 4, 2010.

companies:

The name;

The date of incorporation;

The current status [i.e., whether or not the corporation is active by paying its yearly registration fee];

Copies of the articles of incorporation;

The registered agent and its address [one registered agent may have registered thousands of companies],

The following are not available:

Names of beneficial owners;

Names of any creditors;

The identity of the payer of annual administration costs in the BVI;

The names of the directors are not publicly available.⁵⁷

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) can be an excellent starting-point for more developed collection of information especially when married to a legal case designed to attack nexuses' fraud and money-laundering activities. The sources used to research this monograph prove the value of investigative journalism and the World Wide Web. The Internet is a relatively untapped resource. Lowenthal explains:

“Experienced intelligence practitioners have discovered that the Internet- meaning searches among various sites- yields no more than 3 to 5 percent of the total OSINT take. That is why practitioners spend much time on what is called the “Deep Web,” meaning that a much larger portion of the Web that has not been indexed by search engines. Some experts estimate that the Deep Web is roughly some 500 times bigger than the easily accessible Web.”⁵⁸

Basic fundamentals in Internet investigations begin with an appreciation of the CRAWL (Communicate Research Analyze Write Listen) process. Cynthia Hetherington, an investigator who specializes in using the Internet to investigate financial crime and conduct corporate due diligence states that all OSINT professionals should be fluent in the CRAWL process. “As varied as these fields [of investigation] are, these experts all need to know the fundamentals of CRAWLing.”⁵⁹ More complex data collection techniques are available through the implementation of software driven solutions that tend to be expensive. Furthermore, analysts should have a familiarity with LDA diagramming so as to be able to track and monitor money flows.

Preemptive disclosure and freezing orders are available in one of the nexuses favorite OFC-Cyprus.⁶⁰ Specialized legal firms may appear *ex parte*, before the court in Nicosia or Limassol and present a *Norwich Pharmacal Bankers Trust Document* (NPBT) which must meet *prima facie* criteria in order to be approved by the court. Civil search orders known as *Anton Piller* orders may be granted in an *ex parte* proceeding allowing a legal team to search computers and documents for evidence of fraud and other financial crime. Finally, a *Mareva* injunction may be ordered by a court in order

⁵⁹ Cynthia Hetherington, *Business Background Investigations: Tools and Techniques for Solution Driven Due Diligence* (Tempe, Arizona: Facts on Demand Press, 2010), p21

⁶⁰ * Author's Note: The civil disclosure and freezing orders described in this paper are not allowed in the United States of America or in jurisdictions such as Austria and Switzerland. The United States, generally speaking, has too many due process laws for potential wrongdoers and thus *ex parte* disclosure and freezing orders are incongruent with the United States Constitution. Austria and Switzerland, whose legal traditions derive from the Code of Justinian and not the English common law, require criminal proceedings to be initiated before freezing orders will be granted.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, p.105. See footnote 3.

to freeze monies acquired through illegal activity.

“Gagging orders frequently accompany pre-emptive search (or Anton Piller) orders, information (or Norwich Pharmacal/Bankers trust) orders, and asset freezing (or Mareva) injunctions. Their purpose is threefold—firstly, as alluded to above, to prevent a discovery target from tipping off the underlying obligor or malefactor; secondly to protect the alleged underlying wrongdoers from further reputational damage [for example a bank that had unknowing facilitated a wrong] if it became known they had become the subject to a search order; and finally to uphold public confidence in the fair administration of justice.”⁶¹

This paper argues in favor of a collective intelligence effort beginning with collaboration of Western intelligence agencies with organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Egmont Group which specialize in combating money laundering and developing financial intelligence. The FATF has played an important role in other overt efforts to combat, for instance, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), through its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Thus, the mechanisms used to combat the financing of the nexuses have a dual-use role of combating the financing of WMD proliferation and terrorist activities. A collaborative effort should be made through specialized law firms which are trained to obtain *ex parte* disclosure and freezing orders in OFC jurisdictions in order to terminate the money flows of the nexuses. Specific recommendations to the United

States Intelligence community include the funding and training of more robust HUMINT and FININT capabilities.

Intelligence organizations offer the benefit of their expertise in covert data collections and investigations to answer questions relating to “how” a particular financial crime took place. It is important to remember that the perpetrator of a fraud is generally known, but how the crime was committed is much more difficult to prove. Therefore, the entire investigative process must utilize both forward traces (from the commission of the crime) and reverse traces (from the point the ill-gotten monies were spent) in order to determine not only how the fraud was committed but what other entities may be beneficiaries from the fraud.


Covert action is not exclusively the purview of the U.S. and allied intelligence community. Many private investigative and security services may utilize covert investigative processes in order to determine how a financial crime was committed and who has benefitted. However, intelligence agencies have more capabilities and trained professionals to execute such investigations. In order to maximize results, intelligence agencies can work in collaboration with specialized legal firms to provide covertly attained information to the firm which is planning a legal challenge to uncover who the UBO, which is hiding behind a series of nameplate corporations. Thus the CIA could provide information to the legal firm on where the hidden monies are being housed, for instance in a Cyprus bank account. The legal firm now “knows where to look” and can begin the legal process of

⁶¹ Martin Kenney, “British Virgin Islands: The Use Of Sealing and Gagging Relief in Complex Insolvency Proceedings Involving the Investigation of Fraud and Discovery of Hidden Assets” *Mondaq News*, July 22, 2010

building a case in order to attain a NPBT order and Anton Piller orders with the eventual objective of freezing the assets (Mareva injunction) of the perpetrators (i.e., the players in the nexus).

All investigations must begin with specific goals in mind. Investigative steps must be based on logical assumptions of the necessary sequence of events.⁶² Covert data collection should be married to investigations and legal proceedings. All cases will not be appropriate for using courts to target the nexuses. At this point the pendulum swings heavily to the intelligence community where mission-based counterintelligence techniques, to quote Jennifer Simms, may be employed to dissuade nexuses from using the financial systems to achieve their objectives.⁶³

The destructive role of the nexus as described in this paper is clear. Acts of corruption and fraud have served to undermine the sovereignty of nations such as Ukraine and the integrity of financial markets worldwide. Yevgenia Albats has stated: “The FSB is no longer just a police organization, it is a business.”⁶⁴ Certain businesses, in particular the transportation of natural gas from Russia to its European neighbors, provides fertile ground for the security services to work in unison with organized crime and entrenched political and business elites in order to achieve an eclectic variance of goals. The goals may be based on the

interests of the state, group, or individual actor. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies in partnership with specialized legal and asset recovery teams may target the nexuses globally, but in particular in the OFCs, which possess laws favorable to masking fraud and money laundering. The CIA’s HUMINT capabilities must be increased in countries whose banking secrecy laws may be used by the nexuses to achieve malevolent objectives. The legal process available in English common law jurisdictions should be employed to seize the assets of any member of the nexus or third-party facilitator. If the new FSB is in fact a business, then the operations of the business must be targeted and attacked so the business will cease operations. A business runs on money and if the monies fueling an operation are frozen, that operation ceases to function. In short, a proverbial *nexus of “good”* meaning an alliance of those devoted to upholding the rule of law must work cooperatively to terminate the nexuses of siloviki, organized criminals, and corrupt businessmen operating in the post-Soviet space 

⁶² David P. Metzger and Sarah Duncan, “Facing the Facts: Keys to an effective investigations” *Investigations Quarterly* Vol. 1, Issue.8, 2010

⁶³ Jennifer E. Simms, “Twenty-first Century Counterintelligence: The Theoretical Basis for Reform,” pp.19-20 in Simms, Jennifer and Gerber, Burton (eds.), *Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009)

⁶⁴ As quoted in Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, p.327

The Evolving Terrorist Threat

Adapting United States' Counter-Terrorism Strategy

By Avi Panth & Chris Edelman¹

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S.

Government

Introduction

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush's administration formulated a counterterrorism strategy to curb threats posed by nation states as well as by transnational terrorist groups. This strategy was intended to prevent state actors from passing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to terrorist groups by treating terrorist groups as single entities and focusing on their potential state allies. This strategic formulation has largely been embraced by the Obama administration. Yet many major terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda are not cohesive organizations. Rather, they are composed of many smaller groups, each posing different threats and requiring different interventions. Similarly, there is no single nation state threat. Weak states, hostile states, and

strong states each pose unique challenges and merit distinctly different responses. The Bush administration tended to amalgamate these threats under the "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" rhetoric,² while the Obama administration has demonstrated a better grasp of underlying complexities.³

The truth is that not all threats require direct military action or other drastic risk mitigation measures that impose great financial burden and threaten civil liberties. This paper presents a cohesive framework for the United States to address the threat of terrorism as it relates to state and transnational actors that is grounded in the principles of sound risk management and is sensitive to particular characteristics of each type of threat. First, the paper defines the specific attributes of the state threat as well as the transnational threat. It then discusses and evaluates the effectiveness of the current United States counterterrorism strategy and its unintended consequences. Lastly, the paper defines a novel framework for future engagement of state and transnational actors that is firmly based on viable risk management strategies.

Defining the Terrorist Threat

Al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist actors constitute the primary terrorist threat to the United States today both because of their global reach and because of their stated intentions to harm the

² Bush, George W., "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," Office of the Press Secretary, September 20, 2011, <<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>>.

³ Obama, Barack, 2010 National Security Strategy, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>, pp. 19-22.

¹ Both authors contributed equally

United States.⁴ Several other terrorist groups pose lesser threats to United States interests, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the New People's Army (NPA), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Though several of these organizations have international reach, they focus mainly on local targets and have thus far not sought to create an effective transnational network.⁵ Thus, this paper will not focus on them.

Al-Qaeda, however, continues to affirm its intent to conduct attacks on the United States, legitimizing violence and unprovoked mass murders of United States civilians as an embattled defense of the Islamic faith.⁶ Al-Qaeda is motivated by Islamic fundamentalism, an ideology that claims to promote the original tenets of Islam. Al-Qaeda interprets those tenets as advocating violence. Purportedly responsible only to a divinity whose will it claims supports terrorist actions while disregarding the common moral considerations of Abrahamic religions, al-Qaeda commits significantly more extreme acts against non-combatants than does any other politically-motivated terrorist group.⁷ As such, al-Qaeda is the focus of this paper, though there is room to expand the suggested counterterrorism strategy to deal with other terrorist groups as well.

4 Obama, Barack, "Defense Strategic Guidance," 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>, p. 4.

5 Chalk, Peter, Bruce Hoffman, Robert Reville, and Anna-Britt Kasupski, "Threats in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act," RAND Corporation, 2005, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG393.pdf>, p. 11.

6 Obama, Barack, "Defense Strategic Guidance," p. 1.

7 Richardson, Louise, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 68.

Al-Qaeda's Elements

At the center of Al-Qaeda is its core organization. This comprises the central group of leaders of the organization, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and his close associates. This group is responsible for financing and coordinating high-profile attacks, such as the United States embassy bombings in Africa in 1998 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The core is the element of al-Qaeda that can most easily marshal the resources, logistical capability, and leadership to potentially acquire WMDs and to plan high-profile attacks with large amounts of civilian casualties on United States targets. Though the core is best able to orchestrate the highest profile attacks, it lacks the physical security to do so frequently. The United States-led War on Terror, which included military, financial, and intelligence campaigns leveraging UN and NATO support in the aftermath of 9/11, killed 75 percent of the initial core leadership in Afghanistan.⁸ This forced a second generation of younger, inexperienced cadres to fill critical leadership voids. Furthermore, United States pressure on the core in Afghanistan dispersed its members throughout the Middle East, Northern Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, thereby diminishing its operational effectiveness.⁹ The United States also cut off major sources of international funding to al-Qaeda, freezing over \$130 million of its assets. These initiatives have

8 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009), p. 185.

9 Chalk, Peter, Bruce Hoffman, Robert Reville, and Anna-Britt Kasupski, "Threats in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act," p. 14. RAND Corporation, 2005, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG393.pdf>

forced the core to rely on less lucrative financing methods.¹⁰ At present, the core also faces a crisis of legitimacy, due in part to the success of U.S efforts to counteract al-Qaeda propaganda as well as the consistent rejection of al-Qaeda's violent methods by leaders of the Muslim orthodoxy. This combination of factors poses a key challenge for the core's continued survival.

Beyond the core organization, Al-Qaeda has a network, which consists of affiliates of the core who vary in how closely they follow the core's guidance. For many within the network, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), al-Shabab, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), alignment with al-Qaeda is a pragmatic rather than ideological choice. Members of the network often align themselves with al-Qaeda only to receive financial support from the core and the global publicity that comes with the linkage.¹¹ Their interest in attacking the United States is secondary to their common goal of achieving domestic political outcomes by subverting existing regimes throughout the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Attacks on United States interests are designed to galvanize local support for the network actor's local cause, and these sorts of attacks rarely occur within the United States but are more likely abroad. For example, LeT targeted the Taj and Oberoi hotels in Mumbai where Western tourists often stay. Network actors are generally more limited in their popularity, training, and fundraising capability than are the core al-Qaeda organization; therefore,

they are rarely able to conduct high-profile attacks. However, some network actors such as the al-Qaeda offshoot, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), are more receptive to guidance from the core and are more willing to attack the United States homeland; these network actors constitute the most dangerous aspect of the network threat to homeland security.

Finally, outside of the core and the network lies the periphery. The periphery is not a formal part of al-Qaeda so much as it is an artifact of al-Qaeda core's propaganda, aiming to craft the brand "al-Qaeda" as a global resistance movement to mobilize additional support.¹² The core utilizes the Internet and various social networking strategies to spread recruitment propaganda and instructions for engaging in al-Qaeda's style of violence.¹³ These cyberspace resources facilitate recruitment and radicalization of peripheral actors. The periphery is characterized by its lack of training and resourcing from the core or the network, and its ties to al-Qaeda are largely aspirational.¹⁴ As a result, its attacks are often unsophisticated and physical damage is limited. These individuals include those that self-radicalize within the United States and other Western nations, a group known as "homegrown terrorists." In 2009 alone, forty-three United States citizens were arrested and/or indicted for terrorist activity — more than in any previous year — emphasizing the growing

¹² Ibid., p. 168.

¹³ "A Survey of Al-Qaeda: Winning or Losing?," *The Economist*, July 17 2008, <http://www.economist.com/node/11701218?story_id=11701218>.

¹⁴ Dickey, Christopher, "A Thousand Points of Hate," *Newsweek*, January 11, 2010, pp. 34.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends*, p. 168.

peripheral threat to homeland security.¹⁵ While their attacks are relatively low profile, the periphery constitutes the most persistent threat from al-Qaeda. Because these elements are not well resourced or well connected, they generally do not leave important leads for intelligence and law enforcement personnel. Periphery threats are now the most common terrorist threats to the United States homeland due to the periphery's resilience and the core's decline, though these threats are also generally the least potent.

Defining the state threat

The second element of the terrorist threat comprises state actors that facilitate development of malicious transnational actors, either intentionally or inadvertently. Threats from state actors can be classified using three broad categories: rogue states, weak states, and strong states. Rogue states are openly hostile to the United States and condone or actively sponsor terrorist actors. Salient examples include Iran, Syria, and Sudan. These countries often have active ties to terrorists groups. Iran, for instance, has well known ties to the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah and has even aided al-Qaeda operatives by facilitating their transit to Afghanistan.¹⁶ Similarly, Sudan continues to support the Palestinian terrorist organization,

Harakat al-Muqāwamat al-Islāmiyyah (HAMAS), which it considers to be a group of “freedom fighters” legitimately representing the interests of the Palestinian people.¹⁷ Though the goals of rogue states are often ideologically opposed to those of terrorist organizations seeking safe haven therein, pragmatic interests often facilitate a connection between these two parties. While Iran and al-Qaeda have vastly different religious beliefs—Iran is a predominantly Shi’ite state, and al-Qaeda is a Sunni group vehemently opposed to other interpretations of Islamic ideology—both oppose Israel and the West, thereby fueling a pragmatic connection.¹⁸ Due to the close ties between many such rogue states and terrorist organizations, the West often treats rogue states in a similar manner to the terrorist organizations with whom they collaborate. The ability of rogue states to funnel resources and WMDs to terrorist organizations poses a grave threat that Western nations attempt to curtail, even at very high cost.

Weak states pose a different sort of state threat. Governments of weak states are unable to control terrorist operations within their borders, resulting in safe havens for core and network terrorist actors. Examples include Yemen, which is unable to stamp out AQAP, Somalia, which cannot defeat al-Shabab, and Pakistan, which has no control over LeT. Weak states pose a different kind of challenge than rogue states because they

¹⁵ Bergen, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group” [report], Bipartisan Policy Center, September 10, 2010, p. 5. <<http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf>>.

¹⁶ Eggen, Dan, and Walter Pincus, “New Links Between Iran, Al Qaeda Cited,” *Washington Post*, July 22, 2004, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4191-2004Jul21.html>>, pp. 1-2.

¹⁷ “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” United States Department of State, August 5, 2010, <<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm>>.

¹⁸ Eggen, Dan, and Walter Pincus, “New Links Between Iran, Al Qaeda Cited,” pp. 1-2. See footnote 15.

do not actively facilitate terrorists. They do, however, often become the nexus for terrorist activity. In some cases, these governments may genuinely attempt to curtail terrorist activity, but may be unable to do so due to limits in their policing power, as is the case in Yemen. In other cases, the government is powerless to influence terrorist activity, as is the case in Somalia. Pakistan in particular poses a salient threat as a weak state because it possesses a dubious capability to secure its own nuclear arsenal.¹⁹ United States attempts at intervention to curtail a terrorist threat are occasionally welcomed, as is currently the case with Somalia and Yemen. In other cases, intervention is complicated by sovereignty concerns and can delegitimize and further weaken vulnerable states. For example, though the United States believes some of al-Qaeda's core leadership resides in the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan,²⁰ direct United States military intervention in Pakistani territory undermines the government's legitimacy and ability to maintain order. A broader invasion into this region by United States forces could galvanize terrorist activity in those states by further radicalizing local supporters.

Finally, threats can emerge from strong states, which are characterized both by their ability to limit terrorist activity within their borders and by their commitment to doing so. These states often include the United States' closest allies such as

Germany, India, and the United Kingdom—most of which are also democratic states. However, this category also includes authoritarian regimes that are not always friendly to other United States policy interests, such as the current governments in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These authoritarian strong states, however, share a strategic interest in eliminating terrorist groups within their boundaries. For instance, the Egyptian regime under Hosni Mubarak took strong measures to undermine groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (a creation al-Zawahiri, of core al-Qaeda leader), which had tried on several occasions to assassinate him, and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (an al-Qaeda network affiliate). Now that Mubarak has been deposed, it remains to be seen what approach a newly-elected government in Egypt will take toward terrorism and United States engagement.

Current Engagement Strategy Transnational actors

The United States currently confronts the core organization and network actors by eliminating resource and revenue streams, targeting military installations and leaders, and seeing to promote a positive image of the United States abroad. Furthermore, the U.S. has targeted peripheral actors through controversial forms of intelligence gathering and law enforcement intervention.

Confrontation begins at the core organization. Here, the United States makes strong use of financial operations. Specifically, the United States and the United Nations have leveraged

¹⁹ Goldberg, Jeffrey and Marc Ambinder, "The Ally From Hell," *The Atlantic*, December, 2011, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/8730/>>.

²⁰ Walsh, James Ingoe, *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing* (New York: Columbia UP, 2010), pp. 1-2.

stringent economic sanctions to curtail the core al-Qaeda's funding.²¹ Sanctions target charities, companies, and personal assets that aid core leadership. Al-Qaeda has lost a significant portion of its operational budget as a result of such efforts, and sanctions have also made it more difficult for al-Qaeda to collect money.²²

The United States also pursues military and intelligence operations against the core organization. The United States has mobilized broad military force in Afghanistan to attack al-Qaeda safe-havens, most notably, the core's organizational centers and training camps. The CIA utilizes a sophisticated combination of signals intelligence and human intelligence to track and subvert core activities. The United States has also made particularly extensive use of special operations forces and intelligence-operated drone strikes to target core al-Qaeda leaders.²³ These initiatives reflect a prioritization on decapitation strategy—that is, degrading the quality of the organization through targeted killings of its leaders. Decapitation initiatives are generally targeted towards leaders, aiming to minimize collateral damage. For example, military directives limit the use of air and mortar strikes to prevent civilian casualties in Afghanistan due to the recognition that civilian casualties lead to the potential for further radicalization.²⁴ The successful assassination operation of Osama Bin

Laden is an example of decapitation strategy, leveraging special operations forces and intelligence resources, to target leaders while minimizing collateral damage.

But force without rhetoric is insufficient. Therefore, the final strategy the United States applies against the core is counter-narrative strategy, which involves waging a campaign to dispel key narratives promulgated by al-Qaeda's prolific media arm.²⁵ The Obama administration has taken positive steps to delegitimize the narrative that the United States allows the abuse of Muslims, by signaling a desire to continue a ban on waterboarding (an interrogation technique using simulated drowning used until 2005) and extraordinary renditions (the transfer of detainees across legal jurisdiction for intelligence gathering). There have, admittedly, been mixed results; the United States still transfers detainees to other countries, though there are stringent safeguards to ensure that detainees are not tortured and such renditions are conducted within legal frameworks.²⁶ The Obama administration's choice to end the use of charged phrases such as "War on Jihad," which was interpreted as an attack on the Islamic tenet of Jihad (peaceful self struggle), counters the narrative that al-Qaeda are defenders of Islam and that faithful Muslims should support al-Qaeda.

21 "UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee Overview," The United Nations, 2010, <<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/>>.

22 Chalk et al., "Threats in Terrorism," p. 14. See footnote 9.

23 Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann, "The Drone War," New America Foundation, June 3, 2009, <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/drone_war_13672>, pp. 1-3.

24 Ibid.

25 Leuprecht, Christian, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Clark McCauley, "Winning the Battle But Losing the War? Narrative and Counternarrative Strategy," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 3 No 2 (2009), pp. 1-5.

26 Wang, Marian, "Under Obama Administration, Renditions—and Secrecy Around Them—Continue," *ProPublica*, September 6, 2011, <<http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/as-rendition-controversy-reemerges-obama-admin-policies-murky>>.

The United States recognizes that there is a difference between al-Qaeda's core and its network, but it still utilizes similar methods to deal with network actors as it does with the core. The Obama Administration has made positive developments by acknowledging that the terrorist threat extends beyond Al-Qaeda's core to many network groups that are distinguishable in crucial ways. President Obama explicitly acknowledged in his 2010 National Security Strategy that "[al-Qaeda's] core in Pakistan remains the most dangerous component of the larger network, but we also face a growing threat from the group's allies worldwide."²⁷ The Transportation Security Administration's recent decision to outfit airports with full body scanners and pat-downs in response to network actor Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab's attempt to blow up an airliner with explosives smuggled in his underwear on Christmas Day of 2009 reflects a growing sensitivity to network actors. (Abdulmutallab was trained and resourced by AQAP, a network affiliate of core al-Qaeda.) Still, the United States utilizes similar financial operations to fight network elements, such as LeT, as it does with core elements.²⁸ Similarly, it marshals military and intelligence resources—using targeted killing with drones and special operations forces to counteract network actors such as AQAP.²⁹

The final threat the United States confronts comes from the periphery. Counter-narrative strategies are broadly targeted towards individuals at risk of self-radicalizing—the main constituency of the periphery. These strategies undermine the justifications that al-Qaeda utilizes to recruit members. Similarly, the United States secures important sites to prevent peripheral attacks, because an under resourced peripheral actor cannot orchestrate an attack with the sophistication necessary to attack these newly secured sites. Financial and military operations are not relevant against peripheral actors given that they leave few financial traces and can more easily be intercepted by domestic law enforcement. However, the Bush administration utilized intelligence assets to detect and counteract peripheral threats. Namely, the administration used data mining (an electronic data profiling practice) and a controversial domestic wire-tapping regime authorized by the PATRIOT Act, amid controversy, to more adeptly intercept "homegrown" peripheral threats.

State Actors

The United States has had a more difficult time attempting to form cohesive security policy to deal with state actors. The great diversity and breadth of threats that emanate from this category makes it a particularly difficult one for any country to confront, and the United States in a particularly precarious situation given its forward deployed military posture and various commitments throughout the world. The result of these

²⁷ Obama, Barack, 2010 National Security Strategy, p. 20. See footnote 3.

²⁸ Kellerhals, Merle D, "Treasury Imposes Sanctions on Two Pakistan-Based Terror Groups," America.Gov, November 4, 2010, <<http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2010/November/20101104160614elr-em0.4170191.html&distid=ucs>>, pp. 1-2.

²⁹ Priest, Dana, "United States Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on Strikes," Washington Post, January 27, 2010, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012604239.html>>, pp. 1-2.

complications has been that the United States has responded to individual threats from state actors as they have emerged. Though the Bush administration established a very clear dichotomy between states that support the United States and states that oppose the United States,³⁰ the United States' foreign relations are far more complex and merit intensive review and revision as circumstances around the world change—particularly in the case of dealing with strong state actors.

When dealing with rogue states, the United States and the United Nations have implemented crippling financial sanctions on state sponsors of terrorism.³¹ These sanctions have affected Iran and Syria particularly harshly but have not shown significant promise in accomplishing their policy goals. For example, the European Union recently followed the United States' lead in placing an embargo on all oil from Iran in order to halt its nuclear ambitions.³² Although rifts between President Ahmadinejad and the Ayatollah Khamenei in late 2010 suggest that formerly instituted sanctions may be burdening Iran's political leadership, Iran remains determined to pursue nuclear weapons at all costs at the time of publication of this article and Russia refuses to support further sanctions. Similarly, it seems that the threat of sanctions has done little good in Bashar al-Assad's Syria, because Russia and China remain determined to block any UN Security Council resolution con-

demning al-Assad or instituting sanctions.³³ The Bush administration also articulated a willingness to preemptively attack, with full military force, rogue states that it suspected of aiding or abetting terrorists. Indeed, the rogue state of Iraq under Saddam Hussein was toppled based on the presumption (later found to be false) that Saddam Hussein possessed WMDs and was working with al-Qaeda. Such preemption, however, has been applied in a rather ad hoc manner at times and is unsustainable given the amount of resources it requires. For example, rogue states with purportedly similar links to al-Qaeda—namely Iran—have so far not been subject to similar preemptive action, though this might change in the near future.³⁴ Weak states require different interventions than strong states. With weak states, the United States' effort should often begin with capacity building. The United States provides development assistance and aid for weak states that cooperate in the fight against terrorist groups. The United States has made extensive use of military-civilian hybrid groups called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to develop roads, water, and electricity throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. The central logic behind these initiatives, as articulated by John Brennan, the Deputy National Security Advisor for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, is that providing for the needs of vulnerable people in weak states makes them less beholden to

30 Bush, George W., "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People". See footnote 2.

31 "UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee Overview". See footnote 21.

32 "Sanctions and Iran: Beleaguered But Still Unbowed," *The Economist*, January 21, 2012. < <http://www.economist.com/node/21543157>>

33 "How to Set Syria Free," *The Economist*, February 11, 2012. < <http://www.economist.com/node/21547243>>

34 Eggen, Dan, and Walter Pincus, "New Links Between Iran, Al Qaeda Cited," pp. 1-3. See footnote 15.

the influence of terrorist groups.³⁵ Unfortunately, despite the best US intentions, only a fraction of this money actually supports development; much of the aid is absorbed by corrupt politicians in countries like Afghanistan and Yemen.

The United States has sought to train weak governments' police, intelligence, and military forces to conduct operations against terrorists. In Yemen and Somalia, for example, the United States has deployed military and intelligence assets to assist local governments in fighting terrorism within their borders.³⁶ Yet, such initiatives often have the detrimental effect of fueling other sectarian conflicts and thereby exacerbating the terrorist threat. For example, aiding the Pakistani military could inadvertently sustain Pakistan's conflict with India and further destabilize the region.

In some cases, the United States has also sought to share intelligence with weak governments to encourage government responses to indigenous terrorist groups such as in Pakistan. However, this strategy is often ineffective, given that a weak government does not often have the capability to tactfully act on the intelligence provided. In fact, this strategy can even have a detrimental impact if there are elements within the indigenous government that are sympathetic towards the terrorists' cause.

While weak states pose serious challenges, the United States has faced difficulties in responding

to the relatively recent threat of "homegrown" terrorists originating in strong states. It often reacts to such threats as they emerge, given the unique circumstances involved in each case and the lack of previous experience in confronting this danger. Here, the United States has primarily employed intelligence sharing. Strong states share a strategic interest in eliminating terrorist threats within their borders. As a result, sharing operational intelligence on a terrorist threat within a strong state often results in an immediate and effective response to the threat. Yet, the degree of intelligence cooperation has historically varied widely based on bilateral cooperation on other foreign policy objectives, democratization, and other factors tangential to strategic interest in countering terrorism.³⁷

It is important to note that the categorizations of "strong", "weak", and "rogue" states are imperfect and do not encapsulate the complexities of all countries' political situations. The ongoing Arab Spring movement further illustrates this complexity. In reality, many states constantly shift between these categories and embody characteristics that cut across different state types. The wave of "Arab Spring" uprisings throughout the Middle East has seen Egypt, for example, transition from a strong military state with deep ties to the United States to one with some rogue features that has demonstrated willingness to thwart US interests.³⁸

35 Brennan, John, "A New Approach for Safeguarding Americans," Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC: Federal News Service, 2009). <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-john-brennan-center-strategic-and-international-studies>>

36 Priest, Dana, "United States Military Teams," pp. 1-2. See footnote 29.

37 Walsh, James Ingoe, *The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing*, p. 17.

38 "Egypt PM: Aid Cutoff Threats Won't Deter NGO Case," Voice of America, February 8, 2012, <<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Egypt-PM-Aid-Cutoff-Threats-Wont-Deter-NGO-Case-138943249.html>>.

It remains to be seen how these transformations will affect counterterrorism planning and cooperation, but the United States will likely soon have to formulate an overarching strategy to respond to such transitions.

Unintended Consequences of the Current Strategy

The current counterterrorism framework has successfully undermined the most organized and potent aspects of al-Qaeda—the core. The relative simplicity of recently attempted attacks, such as Mohamed Osman Mohamud’s failed car bomb attack at the Portland Christmas lighting ceremony in 2010 underscores this point.³⁹ However, the proliferation of lower profile attacks in recent months suggests that the War on Terror may have shifted the threat away from the core instead of neutralizing the threat altogether. The United States has been less capable of finding an appropriate solution to deal with newly empowered network and peripheral actors than it has been with fighting the core. Furthermore, the United States lacks a unified strategic framework to deal with state actors. The prevailing perception that all aspects of al-Qaeda pose approximately equal threats and warrant similar risk mitigation skews United States responses toward network and peripheral actors, to the detriment of sound threat mitigation. Most tellingly, efforts to combat network and

peripheral elements in a similar manner to the approach taken to counter core elements are often ineffective, strain the budget, and may incur cost to civil liberties.

The main reason to suspect that these strategies may be ineffective is their tendency, in some cases, to shift risk rather than eliminate it. Al-Qaeda now relies less on centrally coordinated core attacks than it does on decentralized network and peripheral attacks that, while less potent, pose more persistent risks to US interests. A corollary to this changing emphasis is al-Qaeda’s targeting of sites of purely civilian importance (e.g., hotels, nightclubs, and transportation hubs), or “soft targets.”⁴⁰ Since 9/11 the United States has sought to better protect important economic centers, military sites, government buildings and diplomatic missions through revised security protocols.⁴¹ Attacking such “hard targets” is a more difficult endeavor, particularly for peripheral actors lacking resources. The major threat has thus shifted to “soft targets.”⁴² Examples include recently attempted attacks in 2010 on the Washington DC subway system, at the Oregon Christmas tree lighting ceremony by peripheral actors, and on hotels in Mumbai by network actor LeT.⁴³ Most recently,

39 Miner, Colin, Liz Robbins, and Erik Eckholm, “F.B.I. Says Oregon Suspect Planned ‘Grand’ Attack,” *The New York Times*, November 27, 2010, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/us/28portland.html?pagewanted=all>>.

40 Thomas, Pierre, Richard Esposito, Jack Date, and Jack Cloherty, “Osama Bin Laden Evidence: Al Qaeda Considered 9/11 Anniversary Attack,” *ABC News*, May 5, 2011, <<http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/osama-bin-laden-evidence-al-qaeda-considered-911/story?id=13536789>>.

41 Chalk et al., “Threats in Terrorism,” p. 19. See footnote 9.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

43 Temple-Raston, Dina, “Arrest Made In Alleged D.C. Subway Bombing Plot,” *National Public Radio*, October 27, 2010, <<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130863410>>; Miner, Colin, Liz Robbins, and Erik Eckholm, “F.B.I. Says Oregon Suspect Planned ‘Grand’ Attack;” Bajaj, Vikas and J. David Goodman, “3 Bombs Hit Crowded Sites in Mumbai,” *The New York Times*, July 13, 2011, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14mumbai.html>>.

in 2012, a Moroccan individual who mistakenly believed that he was working with al-Qaeda was arrested for plotting to detonate a bomb in the US Capitol.⁴⁴

The threat of attack on such “soft targets” can generate considerable and unnecessary costs that the current administration is seeking to reduce. A pillar of al-Qaeda’s strategy is to provoke the United States to increase security levels at great cost and thereby inflict financial burden on the country. Even unsuccessful attacks are deemed victories for al-Qaeda if they cause the United States to further increase security and incur the accompanying costs. Al-Qaeda’s strategy would indeed seem to be working. As previously mentioned, in reaction to the failed Christmas Day bomb plot in 2009, the United States is installing full body scanners at domestic airports at a cost of \$2.4 billion.⁴⁵ Such scanners take longer to process passengers than standard magnetometers, resulting in longer wait times and burden to airlines and passengers.⁴⁶ The Obama administration has recently indicated “the Department [of Defense] must continue to reduce the “cost of doing business.”⁴⁷ In an age of austerity, an age in which defense planners view the nation’s deficit as the eminent national security threat, the United States must avoid costly and superfluous security

measures.⁴⁸

Besides financial considerations, some legal experts have raised concerns that Americans may be facing significant costs regarding civil liberties. To begin with, privacy issues may arise. Airline passengers must go through scanners that create images of travelers that resemble fuzzy photo negatives or chalk etchings and reveal the person’s silhouette, including genitalia outlines.⁴⁹ The only alternative is to have a comprehensive pat down. Some critics claim that these policies may be too invasive and unnecessary to accomplish the goals involved.⁵⁰ There have also been allegations of human rights abuses. In the early days of the War on Terror, a new type of rendition emerged that was distinct from traditional transfers of people across legal jurisdiction (e.g., deportation and extradition) in its aim to extract intelligence from detainees. Human rights groups have alleged that, in some instances, rendered individuals were tortured upon transfer.⁵¹ Regardless, the United States has since implemented protections and safeguards to prevent detainees transferred to other countries from being tortured.⁵²

44 Horwitz, Sari, William Wan, and Del Quentin Wilber, “Federal agents arrest Amine El Khalifi; he allegedly planned to bomb Capitol,” *The Washington Post*, February 17, 2012, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-agents-arrest-man-who-allegedly-planned-suicide-bombing-on-us-capitol/2012/02/17/gIQAtYZ7JR_story.html>.

45 Chalk et al., “Threats in Terrorism,” p. 10. See footnote 9.

46 Rosen, Jeff, “Nude Awakening,” *The New Republic*, February 4, 2010, <<http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/nude-awakening>>.

47 Obama, Barack, “Defense Strategic Guidance,” 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>, p. 7.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

49 United States Government Accountability Office, “Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement of the Advanced Imaging Technology” [report], (Washington, D.C., 2010). <<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10484t.pdf>>

50 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

51 Grey, Stephen, *Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006).

52 “Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President,” *The United States Department of Justice*, August 24, 2009, <<http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html>>.

New Strategies

Risk management and balancing priorities. A new counterterrorism strategy must be firmly rooted in the principle of risk management while balancing the terrorist threats with other national priorities. To create the proper policy, it is crucial to recognize that different threats require different responses. The level of social and fiscal sacrifice undertaken to mitigate a threat should also be commensurate with the danger of the threat. Here, we suggest a new counterterrorism strategy that is divided into recommendations to deal with transnational actors and recommendations to deal with states. Within each category, recommendations are sub-divided following the framework used to describe the terrorist threat. It is not intended for this strategy to be all-inclusive, but rather for it to provide a framework for clearly identifying, assessing and prioritizing terrorism risk, which could be incorporated into a more comprehensive approach.

Transnational Actors

US counterterrorism policies against transnational actors must focus on subduing the core organization. By exploiting ideological and strategic differences among rival groups and leaders in addition to conducting targeted killings, the United States can marginalize the influence of the core. The United States should also approach some network actors with less military force, depending on the danger of the actors. It should, for instance, remain open to the possibility of using diplomacy to engage network actors with paro-

chial strategic objectives. For example, the Obama administration has recently signaled its willingness to negotiate with relatively moderate factions of the Haqqani Network (a network actor) to reduce insurgent activity in Afghanistan.⁵³ Finally, the United States should address the growing threat from the periphery by further strengthening the FBI's ability to thwart "homegrown terrorism" and by working to physically and psychologically prepare civilians to withstand the next terrorist attack in a manner that does not impinge heavily on fundamental liberties or the budget.

Starting with the core organization, the United States must start with a "divide and conquer strategy" to deal with Al-Qaeda's core leaders. Increasingly, Al-Qaeda has been fragmented since 9/11 by internal strategy and ideological disagreements that lead to in-fighting.⁵⁴ Counter-narrative strategy should focus on intensifying divisions among ideological sub-groups within core al-Qaeda leadership. For instance, there have previously been ideological divides within al-Qaeda over whether to wage war on Western nations or on Muslim countries throughout South Asia and the Middle East perceived to embrace Western culture.⁵⁵ The United States should highlight and exploit these differences to challenge al-Qaeda's symbolic unity. The United States should also stop referring to loosely allied groups as "al-Qaeda."

⁵³ Crawford, Jamie, "Clinton: U.S. Would Negotiate With Taliban Leader," CNN, October 27, 2011, <http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-27/asia/world_asia_us-afghanistan-pakistan_1_haqqani-taliban-leader-insurgents?s=PM:ASIA>.

⁵⁴ Cronin, Audrey Kurth, "How Terrorism Ends," p. 184. See footnote 8.

⁵⁵ Gerges, Fawaz A., *The Far Enemy*, (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2010), p. 120.

Doing so overrepresents al-Qaeda's influence and helps al-Qaeda mobilize support.

The United States should also be extremely careful when targeting killings of key leaders, via drone strikes or other special operations methods. The United States has significantly increased drone strikes against terrorists along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Drone strikes have killed hundred of militants, including several important al-Qaeda leaders. Yet drone strikes also shift risk, as many militants relocate to safer locations in Somalia or Yemen.⁵⁶ Even successful operations may result in limited benefits because Zawahiri no longer has a "formative impact" on the operational integrity of the next generation of al-Qaeda's leaders in the same way that bin Laden once did. Perceived assassination may also galvanize their image as martyrs or empower more extreme successors.⁵⁷ Critics are right to point out that killing al-Qaeda's top leaders will not end al-Qaeda.⁵⁸

These critics also raise complex civil liberties questions, such as the legitimacy of killing American citizens that have joined al-Qaeda (e.g., Anwar Al-Awlaki) without due process. Drone strikes have also had an estimated 31 percent civilian fatality rate, potentially radicalizing Pakistani and Afghan moderates.⁵⁹ However, past experience shows that simultaneously killing many important al-Qaeda leaders has devastating effects on the

organization's efficacy and leadership succession.⁶⁰ Therefore, the United States should continue targeted killings but limit their use specifically to high-risk threats that offer the opportunity to simultaneously eliminate large portions of the leadership of sections or units as opposed to just individuals.

In dealing with the network, the United States should begin limited peace talks. For example, the United States may be able to offer resources devoted to education and reintegration into society to insurgents that agree to give up their arms and permanently renounce violence. The United States should not negotiate with al-Qaeda's central leadership; however, it should be willing to consider the possibility of granting limited concessions to specific local affiliated network groups that offer desirable terms and do not pose a danger to the United States. Discussions of this nature should specifically include an "exit strategy" to current terrorists that limits punishment, when not harmful and expedient, in exchange for cooperation.⁶¹

When confronting the network, it is also crucial to be more discerning and prudent in funding allocation dedicated to counterterrorism. The United States must be careful to not waste resources fighting enemies who claim affiliation with al-Qaeda but share none of its aims to harm the United States. For example, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is a parochial insurgency com-

56 Bergen, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman, "Assessing the Terrorist Threat," p. 21. See footnote 15.

57 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, "How Terrorism Ends," p. 179. See footnote 8.

58 Ibid., p. 179.

59 Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann, "The Drone War," pp. 1-2. See footnote 23.

60 Yoo, John, *War by Other Means: an Insider's Account of the War on Terror* (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2006), p. 57.

61 Cronin, Audrey Kurth, "How Terrorism Ends," p. 186. See footnote 8.

mitted to achieving increased Bangsamoro autonomy from the Philippines, yet it has aligned itself with al-Qaeda in order to elevate its status.⁶² Such network elements often align themselves with al-Qaeda only to elevate their global relevance; US engagement fulfills their objectives to lionize their own cause.⁶³ Accordingly, the United States should be more prudent in its use of military and CIA resources dedicated to fighting such actors. It is also time for the United States to capitalize on the network's mistakes. By targeting civilians and killing Muslims, terrorists have provoked strong rebukes from Muslim scholars and former jihadists.⁶⁴ Polls reveal an increasingly hostile attitude both against terrorists themselves and against suicide bombings throughout the Muslim world. To defeat network terrorist actors, the United States must highlight their flaws, which include their baseless target choice and lack of a positive vision of the future, to the Muslim community.

Finally, the United States must improve its security policy dealing with the periphery. This should begin with thwarting domestic terrorism. The United States must strengthen the FBI's National Security Branch, which was created in 2005, and given responsibility for curtailing the recruitment and radicalization of US residents. To combat "homegrown terrorism," the FBI should work closely with the National Counterterrorism Center,

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of Homeland Security. It should also integrate state and local governments with the federal law enforcement agencies that are already congregated in the form of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force.

In domestic operations, the United States must be especially careful to protect individuals' privacy. The United States must thoroughly investigate domestic terrorists using only lawful channels to avoid: (a) validating jihadists' claims of US government oppressiveness which could potentially radicalize Westerners, (b) "chilling effects" on First Amendment-protected behaviors, (c) negative consequences of predictive government judgments, and (d) erosion of Americans' trust in institutions.⁶⁵ The United States should also carefully analyze some of its most controversial surveillance programs to evaluate whether their goals can be achieved through less invasive measures. Such programs include FBI national security letters (subpoena letters for organizations to relinquish private records without warrant) and data mining. Though the FBI has since limited the use of gag orders in national security letters, the FBI, CIA, and Department of Defense may still obtain data and records about individuals with no probable cause or judicial oversight.

The United States must continue to take a proactive approach by using intelligence to assess vulnerabilities and increase preparedness; however, risk management strategy must recognize that it

⁶² Huang, Reko, "In the Spotlight: Moro Islamic Liberation Front," Center for Defense Information, February 15, 2002, <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/moro.cfm>>.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 184.

⁶⁴ Bergen, Peter, and Paul Cruickshank, "The Unraveling: Al Qaeda's Revolt Against Bin Laden," *The New Republic*, June 11, 2008, p. 17.

⁶⁵ Solove, Daniel J., "Data Mining and the Security Liberty Debate," *University of Chicago Law Review* (2008), p. 359.

is not possible to prevent every attack. Therefore, the United States should incorporate resilience and population hardening into its counterterrorism posture. The United States, at times, forms its security policies by reacting to attempted attacks. Implementing full body scanners, at great fiscal and social cost, in response to a peripheral threat (as opposed to a true core threat) of the “underwear bomber” is one example of such reactionary policy. Jihadists succeed when American overreactions to even unsuccessful terrorist attacks create panic-induced political and economic hardship.⁶⁶ Consequence prevention strategies decrease the harm of terrorist attacks, functioning effectively when attacked without warning. Strategies include bomb-proofing cargo holds, modifying aircraft ventilation to reduce chemical or biological agent damage, and enhancing emergency response preparedness in collaboration with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and local emergency responders.

The United States must also psychologically prepare citizens to withstand attacks. Though politically challenging, the administration should continue to refrain from publicly denying all risk of attack and begin to teach the public how to respond constructively if the United States is attacked. The government must demonstrate effective emergency preparedness plans. The Obama administration has done a respectable job of articulating the importance of this objective, stating in the 2010 National Security Strategy:

⁶⁶ Bergen, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” p. 1. See footnote 15.

If we respond with fear, we allow violent extremists to succeed far beyond the initial impact of their attacks, or attempted attacks—altering our society and enlarging the standing of [al-Qaeda] and its terrorist affiliates far beyond its actual reach. Similarly, overreacting in a way that creates fissures between America and certain regions or religions will undercut our leadership and make us less safe.⁶⁷

Unfortunately, actually carrying out this goal has proven far more difficult than simply communicating it, and there is still significant room for progress to be made. The benefits are so significant, that a stronger effort must be made, however, as implementing resilience measures pay dividends in terrorist prevention as well; if the impact of a terrorist attack diminishes, terrorists have a lower incentive to conduct attacks.⁶⁸

State Actors

The United States should establish a framework for addressing different types of state threats. The framework must allow the government leeway to address different types of states, but it also must provide consistency in order to avoid accusations of bias and to establish a deterrence effect to potential challengers. Generally, the United States should take preventive action against rogue states if there is a clear and present danger that they might harm the United States. Such action could include a military invasion in

⁶⁷ Obama, Barack, 2010 National Security Strategy, p. 22. See footnote 3.

⁶⁸ Jackson, Brian, “Marrying Prevention and Resiliency – Balancing Approaches to an Uncertain Terrorist Threat,” RAND (2008), p.10. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP236.pdf>

the most extreme cases only. The United States should monitor threats from weak states and preempt them only if they elevate drastically in nature, though a full scale military intervention is usually not appropriate. Instead, the United States should prevent radicalization and apply targeted methods to prevent associated threats from elevating. The United States must also make strong states, particularly democracies, its closest allies in the War on Terror. Doing so requires intelligence sharing and a combination of cost-effective prevention with risk internalization.

To begin with, the United States should confront rogue states by making prudent use of preventive action. It is difficult to deter rogue state terrorism supporters because they are more willing to take risks than most states. The United States requires an aggressive solution to deal with these states. The 2002 National Security Strategy declared that the United States would use unilateral force to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMDs—the existence of an “imminent threat” is not necessary. Though the United States has sought to distance itself from parts of this policy, Obama’s continued insistence that “the United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests” continues to make threats to the United States’ enemies more credible.⁶⁹ This consequence is desirable; however, the principle of preventive action is problematic as currently articulated because the United States may bind itself to military action

more readily and indiscriminately than is prudent. Moreover, other countries may follow US precedent and target the United States correspondingly. The Obama administration should therefore publicly acknowledge that, while the United States reserves the right to use preventive military action, it will be prudent in determining when such action is justifiable and will seek congressional approval when at all possible.

In dealing with weak states, on the other hand, The United States’ primary strategy should be to prevent further radicalization. The prevailing counter-narrative should continue to advocate “a new beginning between the United States and Muslims . . . based on mutual interest and mutual respect”⁷⁰ and to define the threat as “violent extremism” as opposed to “radical Islam.”⁷¹ The United States should promote its image as the diverse and accepting country that it has always been and will continue to be—the destination of over one million immigrants annually. This counters the narrative that al-Qaeda promotes, which is that the United States opposes the Islam faith and uses military action to specifically target Muslim states and civilian populations. When weak governments cannot provide basic services like healthcare and education to their populations, the United States has done so to prevent civilians from turning to terrorists for aid.⁷² These pro-

⁶⁹ Obama, Barack, 2010 National Security Strategy, p. 22. See footnote 3.

⁷⁰ Obama, Barack, “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning” [speech], Office of the Press Secretary, (Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt: June 4, 2009).

⁷¹ Lynch, Marc, “Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama” [report], (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2010), p. 3.

⁷² Brennan, John, “A New Approach for Safeguarding Americans”

grams are essential for preventing radicalization in weak states.

On the other hand, the United States must pursue a different campaign in strong states. To begin with, the United States should endeavor to stop the spread of terrorist propaganda. Specifically in oppressive states, the United States should apply diplomatic and political pressure to oblige countries that host terrorist propaganda dissemination networks to force networks to cease those operations.

Within strong states, the United States should also make better use of intelligence gathering and sharing. Significant barriers to information sharing remain within the United States and with allies. The White House's review concluded that the Christmas Day bomb plot could have been prevented at an earlier stage with more integrated intelligence.⁷³ Additionally, it is important to always allow for the possibility of innovation in strong states. Restrictive immigration and visa policies have made it difficult for professionals to enter Western nations. United States restrictions on Pentagon research contracts have prevented some of the brightest individuals of other nationalities from doing state-of-the-art work in critical United States security areas.⁷⁴ The United States and other Western nations must establish expedited visa processes for low-threat, high-importance visitors.

⁷³ Bergen, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman, "Assessing the Terrorist Threat," p. 9. See footnote 15.

⁷⁴ Friedman, Thomas L., "America's DNA" [editorial], *The New York Times*, June 1, 2005, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/01/opinion/01friedman.html>>.

In contrast to dealing with strong states, with which the United States has had a long history of interacting, dealing with transitory states poses a more recent and more novel problem that requires a delicate response based on developing a strong counter-narrative. United States approaches to states in transition require special consideration for counterterrorism planning. Political strongmen such as Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen attempted to frame popular demonstrations in the Arab Spring uprisings throughout the Middle East as Western-inspired provocations. It would seem, for now, that popular demonstrations have not included demonstrations against the United States—with the exception of some growing US resentment in Egypt—yet, there is the danger that such a narrative could ultimately proliferate, increasing radicalization and support for terrorist organizations. The United States should avoid creating the perception that it is the driving force behind state transitions or domestic unrest and should be especially watchful of how counterterrorism action may be framed as interventionism by political entrepreneurs in furtherance of their parochial ends.

Transnational Actors—State Synergy


There is perhaps no graver threat to United States security than a WMD in the possession of a terrorist group. There are two primary ways in which this could occur. The first is through alliances that form between rogue states and transnational actors—generally established by the political leaders of states and the core of terrorist organizations. Such an alliance could theoretically en-

able a rogue state to deliver a WMD to a terrorist organization. Even if weapons transfer does not occur, rogue states allied with terrorist groups seriously threaten global stability by sustaining terrorist organizations through funding and through the provision of safe haven. United States counterterrorism strategy should therefore place a special emphasis on gathering and integrating intelligence sources to determine rogue state alliances with terrorist organizations and monitoring the acquisition and transfer of weapons. In some cases, military action may be needed to prevent weapons transfer to terrorist groups.

The second way in which terrorists might acquire WMDs is by physically taking them from an unsecured weak state. As previously mentioned, Pakistan is an example of a weak state that possesses nuclear weapons which it may be unable to prevent terrorists from obtaining. The United States' strategy must be to prevent the proliferation of WMDs to weak states and to secure WMDs that weak states already possess. To prevent WMD proliferation, the United States must work with its strong state allies and the United Nations Security Council to establish international regulations and safeguards similar to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that extend to other types of WMDs and that are more easily enforceable. Simultaneously, the United States should expand on programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program that dedicate financial assistance to safeguarding vulnerable weapons and nuclear stockpiles in weak states. These initiatives reduce the risk of vulnerable armaments and

nuclear stockpiles falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.

Conclusion

State actors and transnational organizations continue to pose unique counterterrorism challenges. The United States' current counterterrorism strategy correctly acknowledges this fact, yet does not adequately distinguish between the different types of state and transnational threats. The framework for a more comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, based around nuanced responses to different elements of each threat, is presented in this paper. While the recommendations presented here are not intended to be comprehensive, they provide a first step in grounding strategic counterterrorism planning in sound risk management principles. Additional research on engagement strategies for each element of the transnational and state threat is needed for a more complete counterterrorism strategy. 

Understanding Suicide Terrorism

A case study of Pakistan

By Khuram Iqbal

Introduction

The first decade of 21st century witnessed a phenomenal increase in religiously and politically motivated violence on a global level. International intervention in Afghanistan (October 2001) and the invasion of Iraq (March 2003) further aggravated the threat, which continues to spill-over to conflict zones in the Middle East, South Asia, and other parts of the world. Terrorist outfits are not only expanding their outreach but also influencing each other in many ways. Be it their ideological twists or operational tactics, militant organizations are aptly exchanging ideas and resorting to more lethal ways to destabilize the apparatus of states. For instance, the tactic of suicide bombings was unheard of in Pakistan until the arrival of Al-Qaeda in the region, and the dissemination of its violent/militant ideology helped radicalize the predominantly-Pashtun Taliban militants on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border.⁷⁵ Consequently, suicide missions became one of the most frequently used tactics by terrorist groups operating in the region.

⁷⁵ The first ever suicide attack on the soil of Pakistan was carried out by Al-Qaeda on November 25, 1995, at the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad. Similarly, the global terrorist outfit also perpetrated the first ever suicide attack in Afghanistan on September 9, 2001, when an Arab assassin disguised as a journalist blew himself up and killed veteran Afghan-Tajik leader, Ahmad Shah Masood

Suicide attacks in Pakistan have risen sharply since July 2007. Pakistan experiences the highest rate of suicide attacks after Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷⁶ The networks and training infrastructures of suicide bombers in Pakistan pose a real security threat not only to Pakistan, but also impact its neighbours and beyond. Human bombs recruited and trained by Pakistani-Taliban factions are also sent to Afghanistan to target American and NATO forces stationed in the country. In January 2008, a Taliban commander stated on condition of anonymity that the Pakistani Taliban sent more than 140 trained suicide assassins to Afghanistan between 2006 and 2008.⁷⁷ The practice soon spread to sectarian conflict in Iran where a group called Jundullah⁷⁸ carried out and claimed the first ever vehicle-borne suicide attack inside Iran in December 2008.⁷⁹ Investigations into the attack showed that Jundulla-Iran was either supported or at least influenced by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi⁸⁰ to resort to the use of human bombs.⁸¹

The emergence and evolution of suicide terrorism in Pakistan indicates that there is an abundance of people willing to die in order to

⁷⁶ Khuram Iqbal, 'Drivers of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan', RSIS Commentaries, February 27, 2008, www.pvtr.org/pdf/commentaries/RSIS0212008.pdf, last visited December 24, 2008.

⁷⁷ Abdul Hai Kakar, BBC Urdu, January 10 2008, www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/story/2008/01/printable/080110_bombers_suicide_rza, last visited February 27, 2008.

⁷⁸ Jundullah-Iran is a militant organization consisted largely of Sunni tribes residing on the Pakista-Iran border. The organization is waging an armed struggle for socio-political empowerment of minority Sunni sect in Iran.

⁷⁹ Nazila Fathi, "Rare Suicide Bombing in Iran Kills 4" New York Times, December 29, 2008, at A7.

⁸⁰ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is known to be the deadliest Urban terrorist outfit in Pakistan. The group, formed in 1996 to counter increasing influence of Iran-backed Shias in Pakistan, vows to turn the country into a Sunni-theological state

⁸¹ Khuram Iqbal, 'And Now the Female Bombers' Weekly Pulse, Islamabad, January 14, 2011., pp. 13.

pursue the goals set by their recruiters. What explains this phenomenon? Numerous studies have been conducted thus far to explain the genesis and the socio-political and physiological effects of suicide terrorism in a systematic manner. In view of the existing literature on the subject, the factors behind suicide terror may be roughly divided into five tenets: (1) nationalism or resistance to occupation⁸²; (2) Islamist fundamentalism or Salafism⁸³; (3) effectiveness;⁸⁴ (4) absolute or relative deprivation;⁸⁵ (5) revenge.⁸⁶ Unlike the case studies of Palestine, Iraq and Sri Lanka, the case of suicide terrorism in Pakistan has yet to be systematically studied. The above-mentioned hypotheses have yet to be tested. The proposed study aims to fill this gap by determining if the existing theories sufficiently explain the emergence and the evolution of one of the most brutal forms of social, political and religiously motivated violence – suicide attacks.

The study intends to develop a better understanding of suicide terrorism in Pakistan through empirical research and analysis. A system-

atic description of this phenomenon and cross-testing of the existing hypotheses from other parts of the world will contribute in testing or revising the existing theories on the causes and prevention of suicide terrorism. The research aims will be achieved by conducting an in-depth single-case study research on the emergence and the evolution of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. This process will start with the examination of existing theories, collecting data that either supports or refutes the theories and then determining if further revisions are required. In short, the investigation incorporates two phases: (1) identify the existing variables on the subject; (2) testing the variables identified by contrasting suicide terrorist campaigns in other conflict zones to cases in Pakistan, and; (3) determining to what extent those variables align with suicide attacks in Pakistan.

Working Definition

For meaningful research, it is imperative to define suicide terrorism. What constitutes a suicide attack? How are suicide attacks different from other forms of attack? Adam Dolnik, Professor of Security Studies at the University of Wollongong, Australia, defines suicide attacks as “A premeditated act of ideologically or religiously motivated violence, in which the success of the operation is contingent on self-inflicted death by the perpetrator(s) during the attack”⁸⁷

82 Robert A. Pape and James K Feldman Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop it (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010) pp. 21-23; Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); pp. 44; M Abdel-Khalek Ahmed “Neither Altruistic Suicide, nor Terrorism but Martyrdom: A Muslim Perspective” (2004) 8: 1 Archives of Suicide Research pp. 99-113.

83 Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” *The Washington Quarterly* 2, (Spring 2006), pp. 127-147.

84 Riaz Hassan, “Global Rise of Suicide Terrorism: An Overview”, *Asian Journal of Social Sciences* 36 (2008), 271-29; LA O'Rourke, “What's Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?”, *Security Studies* 4 (2009), pp. 681-718

85 Whereas absolute deprivation refers to longstanding poverty and unemployment, Atran defines relative deprivation as a situation when converging political, economic, and social trends produce diminishing opportunities relative to expectations, thus generating frustrations that radical organizations can exploit. See Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism” 3, (Summer 2004), *The Washington Quarterly* pp. 67-90.

86 Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 5 (2006), pp. 429-492.

87 Adam Dolnik, “Die and Let Die: Exploring Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 17 (2003), pp. 35.

In light of Dolnik's discussion of problems in defining suicide terrorism, a clear distinction will be made between acts of suicide in which the terrorist killed himself, and those in which the suicide was part of an act of killing others. Therefore, cases in which the attacker shot hostages and then killed himself⁸⁸ will not be included. In the case of Pakistan, a mixture of civilians and political-military actors has been targeted by such *modus operandi*. Terms such as "suicide missions" "suicide attacks" "suicide bombings" and "suicide terrorism" will be used interchangeably to describe the subject of study.

History of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan

"The method of martyrdom operations is the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahideen in casualties." Ayman Al-Zawahiri (Al-Qaeda's Top Leaders)⁸⁹

Following the US led war on terror, Pakistani society witnessed a new wave of social, political and religiously motivated violence in the form of escalated suicide terrorism. The human bombs of various inter-linked terrorist outfits pushed the country into mayhem, indiscriminately targeting

88 Gunaratna describes such incidents as "no-surrender attacks". See for example Rohan Gunaratna, "Global Threat Assessment 2009" RSIS Commentaries, December 30 2008, www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1382008.pdf, last visited May 01, 2011.

89 Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, serialized in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 2-10, 2001, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-NES-2001-1202.

the security forces, political leadership and civilians.

Al-Qaeda is the first group to introduce suicide bombings in Pakistan in 1995; however, a number of Pakistani clerics argue the acts of self-inflicted killing were introduced in Pakistan long before the formation and arrival of Al-Qaeda by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 war against India.⁹⁰ According to these claims, during the second war with India, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, also the then President of Pakistan, ordered his soldiers to lay in front of the 500 Indian tanks advancing on Lahore with anti-tank mines tied to their chests as there was no other way of stopping them.⁹¹ Refuting such claims, a retired Pakistani officer clarified "No soldier was ever ordered by anyone to lay in front of any tank with a mine tied to his body. In fact, in any army no one can order anyone to die in that manner or in any other manner."⁹²

The stories mentioning Pakistani soldiers lying in front of the enemy tanks with mines on their chests are common in Pakistan and perhaps aimed at glorify Pakistani soldiers fighting against their arch rival India. According to the Army circles, "in the aftermath of Pak-India war in 1965, the army was adulated by the nation and all sorts of stories real and imaginary extolling its valour were doing the rounds."⁹³ Nonetheless, there is no evidence to validate such claims.

90 "Islamic suicide bombings not a recent phenomenon, as once thought?" Jihad Watch, <http://www.jihadwatch.org/2008/07/islamic-suicide-bombings-not-a-recent-phenomenon-as-once-thought.html>, last visited May 03, 2011.

91 Ibid.

92 Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd), "Suicide Bombings and Islam", Pak Tribune, July 23, 2008, www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?20361, last visited May 03, 2011.

93 Ibid.

The idea that Al-Qaeda was the first group to introduce suicide bombings in Pakistan is also contested by two Pakistani Counter-Terrorism experts Zaidi and Rana, who claim that the first ever suicide bombing in Pakistan dates back to 1987 (one year prior to the formation of Al-Qaeda). According to Rana, “The first suicide attack occurred in Bajaur Agency of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in 1987, when an Afghan jihad leader, Sheikh Jameelur Rehman was assassinated in his camp in Chamarkand by an Arab Mujahid. The Arab assassin, Abdullah Roomi, belonged to Gulbadin Hikmatyar’s party Hizb-e-Islami. He did also shoot himself at [sic] the spot.”⁹⁴ There are two fundamental problems with this claim. First, it does not fulfill the definition of suicide attack being used for this study since cases in which the attacker shot the target and then killed himself will not be considered as suicide attacks. Second, it is not clear if Abdullah Roomi, the assassin, killed himself after achieving the target or if he was killed by the people surrounding Sheikh Jameelur-Rehman at the time of assassination. A former Jihadi, who took part in the Afghan Jihad and who was also close to Sheikh Jameel-ur-Rehman, claimed that the assassin went to visit Sh. Jameel, who had the habit of welcoming Arabs with open arms. Sh. Jameel hugged the assassin, who then shot the Sheikh many times before he himself was killed.⁹⁵ There are no accounts to determine the

actual cause of Roomi’s death.

In accordance with the definition of suicide terrorism in this study, the first ever such attack on Pakistani soil was carried out by Al-Qaeda on November 25, 1995, when a pickup truck filled with explosives rammed into the gate at the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, killing 15 people and injuring 59 others.⁹⁶ Various evidences substantiate the involvement of the global terrorist outfit in this attack. For instance, the funds for the bombing operation were raised by Al-Qaeda’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, on a fundraising trip to the US in 1993, where he was pretending to be a doctor for a charity raising money for refugees in Afghanistan.⁹⁷ Soon after the bombing, the Pakistani authorities arrested Ahmed Said Khadr on suspicion of involvement in the attack. Khadr was one of the founding members and the key financier of Al-Qaeda.⁹⁸

Since November 1995, Al-Qaeda, in collaboration with Pakistani Jihadi groups, frequently use suicide attacks to achieve strategic goals and eliminate desired targets in Pakistan. The second suicide attack in which Al-Qaeda was directly involved took place in December 2003. The attack was targeted at Pakistan’s former President, Pervez Musharraf, in the garrison city of Rawalpindi. Reports claimed that Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the chief

visited April 22, 2011

⁹⁶ McGirk, Tim, “Bomb kills 14 at Egypt’s embassy” *The Independent*, November 20, 1995, p. A1.

⁹⁷ ‘Context of November 19, 1995: Islamic Jihad Attacks Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan’, www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a111995embassybombing#a111995embassybombing, last visited June 28, 2008.

⁹⁸ “Al-Qaeda Family: A family divided”, *CBC News Online*, March 03, 2004, www.cbc.ca/news/background/khadr/alqaedafamily2.html, last visited June 12, 2008.

⁹⁴ Muhammad Amir Rana, “How the Suicide Attackers Operate in Pakistan” (2007) Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, May 04, 2007. Online version, <http://san-pips.com/download.php?f=pvt0002.pdf>, last visited May 03, 2011

⁹⁵ Islam Life. Discussion Board on Shaykh Jameel ur Rahman Salafi. www.islamlife.com/religion2/forum?func=view&catid=16&id=1844, last

operational commander of Al-Qaeda, master-minded and financed the assassination attempt on Musharraf. Abu Faraj was deeply connected with Al-Qaeda's North African cells before becoming involved in Pakistan. According to Amir Mir, a journalist and expert on Al-Qaeda, it was the first field operation of Abu Faraj al-Libbi.⁹⁹

Until July 2007, suicide attacks were not the preferred tactic for militant outfits operating in Pakistan. The country witnessed only 16 such bombings from 1995 to 2006.¹⁰⁰ The military operation against the "Red Mosque" in Islamabad in July 2007 radically transformed the threat landscape of Pakistan. The hardliner clerics associated with Red Mosque had become vociferous critics of then President Pervez Musharraf, who joined the US led war on terror despite popular opposition. The clerics demanded immediate reversal of the anti-Taliban and pro-US policies he adopted and implementation of Taliban-style Sharia (Islamic law) governance in Pakistan. At the core of dispute between the government and Red Mosque lied a fatwa (religious decree) issued under the supervision of Maulana Abdul Aziz that declared Musharraf should be killed for his pro-Western policies and called military actions against Taliban in the tribal areas un-Islamic.

The religious decree issued by the Red Mosque provided the local and international militants much needed religious legitimacy for their violence directed at the Pakistani state, its

armed forces and law enforcement agencies, and the allied forces in Afghanistan. Such provocative action by the Red Mosque was destined to invite government reaction. Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, the deputy-head cleric at the Red Mosque, admitted that the military establishment was infuriated and the mosque administration was persuaded and pressured by the intelligence agencies to repeal the decree.¹⁰¹ Ghazi, who was serving as an assistant secretary in the education department was also sacked for provoking the public against the government. However, the mosque administration was adamant to uphold the fatwa until Musharraf government ceased military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Red Mosque administration also got involved in anti-government demonstrations demanding the release of individuals picked up by the intelligence agencies on suspicion of their alleged links with the terrorist outfits. Red Mosque clerics were also found involved in the first assassination attempt on Gen Pervez Musharraf in December 2003. Pakistani law enforcement agencies termed the breakaway factions of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) as the prime suspects in the attack. It is pertinent to mention here that the Red Mosque clergy was pivotal in founding Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), long before the international intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. Against this backdrop, confrontation between the mosque and

99 Amir Mir, "Abu Faraj Al-Libbi's Arrest A Decisive Blow To Al Qaeda", Cobra Post, www.cobrapost.com/documents/Abufaraj.htm, last visited April 22, 2009.

100 See Appendix 1

101 Ghazi Abdul Rasheed "Dehshat Gardi ka Drama, Haqaiq Haazir hein" (Fake Charges of Terrorism and the Real Facts), article was published in an Urdu daily in Pakistan and reprinted in an official publications of Red Mosque's publication department. Please see Saeqa Kanwal "Allah Key Sipahi" Publications Department, The Students Movement (Red Mosque) Islamabad, pp 63.

the Musharraf government was inevitable. The security agencies declared Red Mosque and its adjacent seminaries a security risk and ordered the Capital Development Authority (CDA) to demolish them.¹⁰² The Red Mosque clerics and students vowed to “defend the sacred places till last drop of blood”.¹⁰³ Initially “the movement” was only limited to dissuade government from demolishing mosques and seminaries in Islamabad. However, within a few weeks the students and clerics of Red Mosque and its adjacent seminaries started demanding the implementation of strict Islamic laws throughout the country.¹⁰⁴ When “Operation Sunrise” (or Operation Silence as it was later termed by the media)¹⁰⁵ was launched to clear the Red Mosque in July 2007, it marked the most unprecedented event in the history of Pakistan with far reaching consequences. It became the single most cataclysmic event that triggered waves of suicide bombings across the country and turned Pakistan into the security nightmare that it is. In the year 2007, apart from ambushes, roadside bomb blasts and targeted killings of political leaders, nearly 60 suicide attacks were reported throughout the year, which killed at least 770 people and injured 1574 others.¹⁰⁶ Out of these, 37 suicide attacks specifi-

cally targeted security forces and military installations.

This rise was stark in contrast to 7 suicide bombings that were recorded in Pakistan in 2006. More surprising is the fact that in the first quarter of 2008, Pakistan even surpassed war-torn Iraq and insurgency-hit Afghanistan in suicide bombings. At least 18 suicide attacks rocked the country between January 1st and March 1st 2008.¹⁰⁷ Most of the suicide attacks happened in Pakistan’s volatile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. In 2009, suicide attacks in Pakistan continued to rise unabated.¹⁰⁸ Although successive military operations in FATA destroyed a number of training facilities for suicide bombers, the graduates of such training camps continued to strike.

Fig. 1. Chronology of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan

Year	No. of Suicide Attacks
1995	1
2002	1
2003	1
2004	5
2005	2
2006	6
2007	60
2008	63
2009	86
2010	68

¹⁰² Khuram Iqbal, “Children Library to Enforce Shariah?”, South Asia Net, <http://san-pips.com/print.php?id=25>, last visited March 05, 2011.

¹⁰³ Umme Ahsan (The Principal of Jamea Hafsa, a female seminary adjacent to Red Mosque), “Saneha Lal Masjid: Hum per kia guzri (The tragedy of Red Mosque: Our sufferings) Lal Masjid Publications, Islamabad, October 10, 2007, pp. 13.

¹⁰⁴ Since January 2007, Maulana Abdul Aziz started seeing “sacred dreams” — numbering 300 by the time the operation got under way — in which according to him, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) personally ordered him to raise the standard of revolt, declare jihad and implement the sharia on his own. See Editorial: Wages of late action against extremism, Daily Times, Lahore, July 05, 2007

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¹⁰⁶ Pakistan Security Report 2007, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January 2008, Islamabad.

¹⁰⁷ Raza Hamdani, BBC Urdu.com, March 23, 2008, www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2008/03/080323_suicide_attacks_sen.shtml, last visited March 25, 2008.

¹⁰⁸ According to the Pakistan Security Report 2009, published by Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 86 suicide attacks struck Pakistan during 2009.

The year 2010 witnessed 67 suicide attacks occurring at a rate of about five per month, with a little over half occurring in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), the province bordering FATA. The tribal region of FATA was the second most severely affected region by suicide bombings where 14 attacks took place, followed by Punjab with nine suicide attacks. Although still very high, the number of suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2010 was lower than the previous year (compared to 87 such attacks in 2009, 68 suicide bombings were reported in 2010). In the past, each passing year witnessed a gradual and consistent increase in the number of suicide attacks and the consequent fatalities in Pakistan since 2005. However, 2010 was the first year the number of suicide attacks and fatalities in such attacks declined compared to the previous year.¹⁰⁹

Law enforcement agencies contributed to curtailing the number of suicide bombings. According to data collected by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), at least 52 would-be suicide bombers were apprehended by the police and other security agencies across Pakistan in 2010.¹¹⁰ Out of the 1,187 people killed in suicide attacks across Pakistan in 2010, civilians had the highest number of fatalities. A total of 1,049 civilians and 138 personnel of armed forces and law enforcement agencies lost their lives in suicide terrorism. Complex suicide attacks involving multiple bombers increased in Pakistan. Attacks at the shrine of Hazrat Ali Hajveri¹¹¹ in Lahore in July, CID centre

in Karachi in November and the targeting of Shia mourners in Karbala Gamay Shah in Lahore in September are glaring examples of the use of coordinated suicide attacks by terrorist groups. More importantly, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, militant outfits used females to carry out suicide attacks. Three such attacks were reported in 2010. The first ever suicide attack perpetrated by a female struck an Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camp in Kohat in April that year. The attack killed more than 41 people and was attributed to Lashkar-e- Jhangvi al-Almi. The outfit reportedly carried out another attack using a female bomber in Lahore to target a procession of Shia mourners in September.¹¹² The third suicide attack by a female bomber occurred in Bajaur agency in December 2010. This use of female bombers in three such attacks in 2010 raises many important questions including as how and why have the militants opted to use females to launch suicide bombings?

The history of suicide terrorism in Pakistan demonstrates that the particular tactic emerged in the country years after the first such attack hit the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut in 1981. Al Dawa (The Call), the Iranian-backed Shia group that sought to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, claimed credit for the attack¹¹³ Why has the country become a hunting ground for the Fidayeen¹¹⁴ of various terrorist outfits? The following section exam-

109 "Pakistan Security Report 2010" Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) Islamabad, January 2011.

110 Ibid

111 A profoundly honoured Sufi in Sunni-Barelwi tradition

112 Khuram Iqbal, "And Now the Female Bombers" Weekly Pulse, Islamabad, January 14, 2011.

113 Daniel Pipes, "The Scourge of Suicide Terrorism," *The National Interest* (Summer 1986). Cited in Adam Dolnik, "Die and Let Die: Exploring Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 17 (2003), pp. 35.

114 A term used by Pakistani Taliban to define suicide bombers

ines the existing literature on the emergence and evolution of suicide terrorism in other contexts.

Evolution of Suicide Terrorism and Existing Explanations:

A plethora of literature exists on the genesis, rationale and evolution of suicide terrorism in different conflict-ridden societies. The existing literature and theories, however, fall short of sufficiently explaining the emergence, evolution and proliferation of this tactic in Pakistan. A review of existing literature on suicide terrorist campaigns around the world indicates the following five factors as contributing to the emergence and evolution of suicide attacks: 1) Nationalism or Resistance to Occupation; 2) Islamist Fundamentalism or Salafism; 3) Effectiveness; 4) Absolute or Relative Deprivation; and 5) Revenge.

The first set of literature points to nationalism or foreign occupation as the root cause of suicide terrorism.¹¹⁵ Robert Pape, the founder and a proponent of “nationalist theory of suicide terrorism” argues that “every group mounting a suicide campaign over the past two decades has had as a major objective. . .coercing a foreign state that has military forces in what the terrorists see as their homeland to take those forces out.”¹¹⁶ In sum, according to Pape, “the taproot of suicide terrorism is nationalism,” but it is inflamed by intolerance of

religious differences.¹¹⁷ Scholars have found anecdotal evidence in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq that substantiate Pape’s claims. For instance, in September 2007 a report by the United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) validated that the occupation or the perceived occupation of Afghanistan by the foreign forces is a primary motivating factor behind suicide attacks. The report noted that suicide assailants in Afghanistan and their supporters seemed to be mobilized by a range of grievances.¹¹⁸ These include a sense of occupation, anger over civilian casualties, and affronts to their national, family, and a personal sense of honor and dignity from counterinsurgency operations by the allied forces.¹¹⁹ These motivations are all linked to the presence of foreign forces.

Pape’s earlier explanation was based on global data of suicide attacks that occurred in different parts of the world from 1980 to 2003. In 2010, Pape, in collaboration with James K Feldman, tested his earlier thesis against the data collected since 2004. The data showed a substantial growth in the number of suicide terrorist attacks since 2004—nearly 500 percent more attacks than in all the years from 1980 to 2003 combined.¹²⁰ The authors concluded that there was “strong confirmation for the hypothesis that military occupation is the main factor driving suicide terrorism.

115 Robert A. Pape and James K Feldman, “Cutting the Fuse: The explosion of global suicide terrorism and how to stop it” (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 53; Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 61-63.

116 Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, pp. 21

117 Ibid, pp. 79-80; pp. 88-92

118 UNAMA’s report on Suicide attacks in Afghanistan, September 2007, http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/UNAMA%20-%20SUICIDE%20ATTACKS%20STUDY%20-%20SEPT%209th%202007.pdf, last visited December 28, 2008.

119 Ibid.

120 Robert A. Pape and James K Feldman, *Cutting the Fuse*, pp. 10. See footnote 8.

The stationing of foreign combat forces (ground and tactical air force units) on territory that terrorists' prize accounts for 87 percent of the over 1,800 suicide terrorist attacks around the world since 2004¹²¹. The dramatic rise in suicide attacks in Pakistan was also attributed to "the occupation of Pakistan's western tribal region by local combat forces allied to American military forces stationed across the border in Afghanistan"¹²²

It remains to be seen if the groups and individuals involved in suicide terrorism in Pakistan are motivated by the urge to "liberate" their land from the "occupation of Pakistani forces" that are perceived as acting on the behest of the U.S. If nationalism is the root cause of the emergence and rise of suicide missions in the country, which category of nationalism explains this phenomenon? If it is Pakistani nationalism, what is the role of foreign terrorist outfits such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Libyan Islamic Fighters (LIF), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and a number of home-grown terrorists from Western countries in the cultivation and continued logistical, ideological and financial support of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the group responsible for the maximum number of suicide attacks in the country? Significant numbers of fighters, trainers, financiers and suicide bombers from Punjab and other parts of Pakistan may also undercut "Pakhtoon nationalism" as the defining factor behind the "sacrificial

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

attacks"¹²³ in Pakistan.

Pape's argument is widely contested by leading experts in the field of terrorism studies including Bruce Hoffman, Mia Bloom, Jeff Goodwin and Scot Atran. The opponents of "nationalist

Fig 2. Area Distribution of Suicide attacks in Pakistan (1995-2009)

Area	No. of Attacks
NWFP	114
FATA	30
Punjab	34
Sindh	7
Islamabad	14
Balochistan	7
Azad Kashmir	2

theory" of suicide terrorism deduce that identities or ideologies other than nationalism can motivate suicide terrorism.¹²⁴ Citing the examples of the use of suicide bombings by the Sunni militants in Iraq against the Shia and Kurd civilians, and by the Al-Qaeda linked bombers hailing from countries not-occupied by the U.S, Goodwin asserts that "Suicide terrorism, and much non-suicidal terrorism, is usually motivated by nationalism that has been stoked by foreign military occupations, but identities and ideologies other than nationalism have also motivated suicide terrorism, including anarchism and Islamism."¹²⁵

123 The term commonly used by the militant groups in Pakistan for what is generally known today in most parts of the world as "suicide attacks" is Fidayeen (Sacrificial operations)

124 Jeff Goodwin, "What Do We Really Know about (Suicide) Terrorism?" *Sociological Forum* 2 (2006), pp. 315-330.

125 Jeff Goodwin, "What Do We Really Know about (Suicide) Terrorism?", pp. 329. See footnote 50.

Scot Atran also points to Islamist fundamentalist ideology commonly known as Salafism that is fostering the rapid expansion of this modus operandi.¹²⁶ In the case of Pakistan, the influence of Salafism in promoting suicide terrorism may not be ruled out. Multiple suicide bombings carried out by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a sectarian group that vows to implement Deobandi Shariah law (a local version of Salafism that not only opposes Shia Islam but also the dominant Barelwi school of thought in the country), lay credence to Atran's argument. But the ongoing wave of violence in Pakistan raises more difficult questions about the role of religion in promoting suicide terrorism. For instance, if Islamic fundamentalism, with its conception of martyrdom and jihad, is the primary driving force behind suicide attacks, why did militant outfits not resort to this tactic during the Afghan Jihad when the culture of martyrdom and Salafism was injected in Pakistani society under state's patronage? It is not as if the Jihadi outfits taking part in the movement against Soviet occupation could not have imagined suicide terrorism. Hezbollah had already set an example in Lebanon in 1983.

The idea that religion is a primary source of emergence and evolution of suicide terrorism has been discarded by a number of scholars including Capell and Sahliyah¹²⁷, who conclude that to understand modern terrorism's increased

lethality, one needs to look further than religion as a motive and take into account modern terrorists' willingness to use "suicide terror" as their primary modus operandi .

Ami Pedahzur's "Suicide Terrorism" explores the history and origins of this trend by focusing on the suicide terrorist campaigns led by Hezbollah, Palestinian militant outfits, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) and Al- Qaeda.¹²⁸ He contends that suicide bombings have certainly grown exponentially over the last twenty years. But he makes clear, however, that this is not solely an Islamic phenomenon but has been utilized with great efficacy by various militant groups that subscribe to non-religious agenda such as Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealem (LTTE).. "Islam is not the factor that explains suicide terrorism and treating it as such is misleading."¹²⁹ While discussing the evolution of this tactic in a particular conflict, Pedahzur elucidates that the majority of suicide terrorist campaigns were led by a single organization with a definite goal and suicide operatives were dispatched in order to blow up targets related to the goal.¹³⁰ His argument stumbles when one considers the current environment in today's Pakistan, where multiple, not single, terrorist outfits with varying objectives are employing this tactic on a massive scale.

Raiz Hassan and Martha Crenshaw attribute the phenomenal spread of suicide bomb-

¹²⁶ Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism" *The Washington Quarterly* 2 (Spring 2006), p p. 127-147.

¹²⁷ Matthew B Capell and Emile Sahliyah, *Suicide Terrorism: Is Religion the Critical Factor?* *Security Journal* 20 (2007), p. 267-283 cited in Ami Pedahzur, "Suicide Terrorism" (Polity Press, 2005)

¹²⁸ Ami Pedahzur, "Suicide Terrorism" (Polity Press, 2005)

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 23

¹³⁰ *Ibid*

ings to its effectiveness as a tactic.¹³¹ Disregarding psychological or social factors, Crenshaw contends suicide bombing has been steadily rising because terrorists have learned that it is effective. According to Hassan, “suicide attacks cause more deaths, they provide psychological impacts - impacts that are further enhanced by the media coverage.”¹³² According to Mia Bloom’s theory, suicide bombing only come during the second iteration of conflict, after more conventional means have been unable to yield desirable outcomes for the insurgents.¹³³

Jermie Lanche¹³⁴ found anecdotal evidence to substantiate Bloom’s claim. Research by Lanche asserts that the Pakistani case of suicide terrorism is consistent with the existing theories advocated by Pape and Bloom. While applying Pape’s “military occupation” thesis on Pakistan, Lanche argues that the Jihadi forces using suicide bombings in Pakistan perceive their targets (state institutions, religious scholars and political leaders) as the public face of a foreign power, namely the United States. Hence, according to this author, suicide terrorism in Pakistan is largely motivated by the perceived occupation or influence of the U.S in Pakistan, which is resented by the Islamist groups. Anti-Americanism and Jihadi outfits have coexisted in Pakistan for decades. However, the country

only became a victim of suicide bombing campaigns after 2002 and the number of such attacks skyrocketed specifically in the aftermath of “operation Sunrise” against the Red Mosque in July 2007. Which factors explain the non-existence of suicide bombings before 2002? Validating Bloom’s claim, Lanche opined that the aftermath of the 2007 events in Lal Masjid would constitute a second stage in the conflict.

Bloom’s ‘last resort’ theory is contested by Gambetta¹³⁵ and the trajectory of suicide attacks does not support her claim that “non-state actors tend to resort to atrocities in the second iteration (or more) of conflict after the other strategies have failed to yield the desired results, and when faced with a hurting stalemate.”¹³⁶ The TTP initiated a suicide bombing campaign at the peak of its power and popularity. Until 2007, a majority of the Pakistanis regarded the group’s actions as a legitimate struggle against the American occupation of Afghanistan, and the Pakistan government was deemed an American puppet. Militarily, the group maintained a strong control over FATA and its adjacent areas. The operation against the Red Mosque might be a starting point of the second phase of the conflict, but the second part of Bloom’s statement (after more conventional means have been unable to yield desirable outcomes for the insurgents) can be contested in view of the significant concessions offered to the militants be-

131 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Choice”, *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism* 1 (1998) p. 54-64.

132 Riaz Hassan, “Global Rise of Suicide Terrorism: An Overview” *Asian Journal of Social Science* 36 (2008), p. 271-29

133 Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 89.

134 Jermie Lanche, “Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan: An Assessment” Special Report 84, September 2009, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India, Online version www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR84-Jermie-Suicideteriorism.pdf.

135 Diego Gambetta *Making Sense of Suicide Missions* (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 261.

136 Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 89.

fore they initiated the suicide bombing campaigns against the government.

Before 2007, the government allegedly followed a policy of appeasing the Pakistani Taliban through a number of peace agreements, which were widely condemned by the Western media and policy makers as “Pakistan giving in to Islamists”. These pre-2007 agreements included the Shakai Peace Agreement with the Wazir Tribe (South Waziristan) in 2004, the Sararogha Agreement with the Mehsud Tribe (South Waziristan) in 2005, the Peace Accord with the Utmanzai Wazir Tribe (North Waziristan) in 2006 and the Wana Agreement in 2007. Nevertheless, despite these concessions to the militant forces in FATA, the conflict accelerated and in result the country was set to witness the spat of suicide bombings.

Gambetta and Hafez attempt to look at the phenomenon through the use of detailed case studies on one group, or by utilizing a comparative case study, as evident in their works. While Hafez focuses on the Palestinian case, Gambetta examines the motivations and morale of suicide bombers worldwide, focusing the case studies on the Japanese Kamikazes of World War II, Palestinians during the first intifada, and Al-Qaeda in the days leading up to September 11, 2001. Although studies have been useful to trace macro and micro variables behind suicide terrorism, they are limited in explaining the case of Pakistan since the social and geopolitical contexts of the conflicts are very different.

The element of revenge may also be counted as a major factor in the emergence and rise of

“Fidayeen attacks” in Pakistan. Investigations by law enforcement agencies indicate that the conflict zones of FATA and KPK provide an ideal hunting ground for recruiting potential young suicide bombers.¹³⁷ Mostly, these young bombers are locally hired boys, disgruntled and dismayed over the deaths of their loved ones during military operations. Most of the suicide bombers in Pakistan are believed to come from Pashtun-dominated FATA and KPK. Since 2003, massive military operations launched in FATA by the Pakistani military to evict foreign militants resulted in the death of civilians and destruction of property.¹³⁸ Large-scale collateral damage during military operations may have ultimately resulted in the production of hundreds of suicide bombers across FATA and KPK. Pakistan’s military operation and the resulted collateral damage is not the only factor behind producing revenge-seeking suicide bombers. In fact, US drone strikes in FATA and adjacent areas also seem to be contributing to turn individuals against the Pakistani state and society. As a Taliban member once stated, “Our recruiters spend more than 3 months to find a potential suicide bomber. But a single US drone/missile strike makes the task very easy for our recruiters. After each US strike inside our tribal areas, numbers of youth seeking revenge for the loss of their family relative approach our local commanders and register as suicide bombers.”¹³⁹ Such claims by militant outfits need to be verified

137 Interview with an official of Intelligence Bureau (IB), Islamabad, January 6, 2008

138 Ibid.

139 Aqeel Yousafzai, Journalist associated with Frontier Post, Peshawar, July 2008.

and examined in a systematic manner.

Talal Asad, in his study “On Suicide-Bombing”, criticizes the existing literature on suicide terrorism on the account that it chooses to focus on the motivations of suicide-bombers (when motivations are, actually, not accessible by researchers). The closest attempt to explore the causes of suicide attacks in the region has been made by Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi who also tends to discard individual profiling of suicide bombers as inadequate and emphasizes organizational profiling of suicide bombing as the preferred analytical tool.¹⁴⁰ “Profiling the organizations in strife-ridden countries like Pakistan may reveal further fault lines, which could generate valuable projections about the future trajectory of suicide terrorism as an organizational phenomenon,” Zaidi notes. Expanding on Pape’s thesis, he attempts to explain why suicide terrorism has gained common usage by organizations in Pakistan. According to Zaidi, the post 9/11 policy-shift in the Pakistani government against the Jihadi forces they previously supported generated more violent organizations. It seemed like the moderates had become unpopular, and the cadres demanded more ‘affirmative’ actions from the leadership, aggravating the loop of violence. Thus, a plausible explanation for the aggravation of the suicide attacks can be the Pakistan Army’s initiated operations in the tribal areas.¹⁴¹ Whereas organizations play an important role in planning, executing and manipulat-

ing suicide attacks for their cause, critiques of the “organizational approach” maintain that “Rejecting individual factors on the basis of a “fundamental attribution error” (the tendency to explain behavior in terms of individual personality traits when significant situational factors in the larger society are at work) can lead to another fundamental miscalculation: neglecting traits robustly related to particular propensities or temperamental styles.”¹⁴² A systematic understanding of suicide terrorism in Pakistan must consider each possible factor; thus disregarding individual motivations can impede research goals.

Conclusion

A Needed Comprehensive Research Study


In view of the aforementioned studies on suicide terrorist campaigns, it can be safely assumed that the case of suicide terrorism in the context of Pakistan is yet to be established, as there has been a lack of effort made to explore the problem in a systematic manner. Although the country remains one of the worst hit by suicide bombers, a focus on Pakistan has rarely become a topic of empirical or theoretical research on the subject.

A comprehensive research study on the patterns of suicide terrorism in Pakistan must take

¹⁴⁰ Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, “Organizational Profiling of Suicide Terrorism: A Pakistani Case Study” *Defence Studies* 3 (2009), p. 409—453
¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Adolf Tobena from Unit of Medical Psychology, Department of Psychiatry and Forensic Medicine, Autonomous University of Barcelona, raised this important point in a letter to the editor of “Science”. Pls see Letters to Editor ‘Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorism’ *Science*, Volume 304, April 4, 2004

into account the extent to which existing theories on suicide terrorism explain the emergence and evolution of this tactic in Pakistan. Why did the Islamist militant outfits refrain from suicide attacks during the Afghan Jihad? What are the profiles of militant groups using suicide bombings in Pakistan? What is the average profile of the Pakistani suicide bombers? Why has the country witnessed an unparalleled increase in such attacks specifically after “Operation Sunrise” against the Red Mosque in July 2007? Why have the Baloch nationalist and Shia sectarian militant groups not yet resorted to this tactic, despite years of resistance against the central government and the Sunni militants?

To date, the aforementioned critical questions have attracted little systematic research, which will contribute in strengthening, rejecting, or revising the existing theories on the genesis and prevention of suicide terrorism. Apart from filling this academic gap and adding strength to already existing literature on suicide terrorism, the outcome of this study will also contribute in the realm of policy making by providing a systematic understanding of the threat. This will ultimately help in identifying the steps needed to counter suicide attacks on an operational and ideological level 

Book Review

Understanding Al Qaeda

Changing War and Global Politics

By Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedouy

Review by Tom Smith

Yes, another book on Al Qaeda, but according to the blurb, this one “controversially argues that Al Qaeda has clear aims, and the only way to defeat it is to engage with its arguments in a serious way”. And that’s an awfully bold and slightly odd statement of intent for which I think the book can be fairly and critically judged.

Many have fallen foul of the numerous pitfalls in writing on AQ and so reading any new ‘interpretation’ carries baggage that the reader and author should well appreciate. With the best new works adding to the minority of well researched, conceptualised and thought provoking, while the likes of Paul Williams and his 9/11 reactionary, “Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror;” and alike, continue to mislead and engender dangerous ideas about AQs realities and more importantly its meaning. This trend is certainly not limited to academic writings; indeed some of the more biased and inflammatory work (and I would argue most dangerous) has come from policy publications and state apparatuses under pressure for political slogans and hard targets for the evening news.

This new addition to landscape has a dif-

difficult act to follow, to emulate, outdo and engage with the like of Jason Burke, Faisal Devji, Scott Atran, and Fawaz Gerges is certainly no mean feat. But it is in that landscape that this work must be judged. Especially so when the author outlines his premise:

“ This is a work of political science which weighs social underpinnings of political violence and borrows from the legal discipline to make a statement relevant to policy-making meant to address terrorism. It provides an argument about the necessary sober examination of Al Qaeda’s casus belli.”

Mohamedou opens with a chapter dedicated to what he sees as AQ’s casus belli (or justification for war). An excellent decision as this area of understanding is often ignored and more in-depth comment and research is desperately needed. So, it is with deep disappointment then, that the work falls short on this stated goal.

This failure is not down to any one central issue of methodology, political bias or understanding as has been in the case in other works, but an appreciation of the debates and other works in the field which say more than the author manages here, ask more interesting questions and vitally do so in a more fluid and illuminating style.

For instance, in the introduction, an alarm bell rings when Mohamedou notes:

“ It is particularly surprising that policy-makers and academe chose to ignore reasons for which a party is going to war...”

While the deduction is accurate, I am not sure that it is surprisingly ignored. In fact, there is good reason to ignore that difficult question.

Who, for one, would know why AQ acts? Isn’t it much more natural to cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war rather than ‘get inside the head of those evil terrorists?’ If Mohamedou has been surprised by the reluctance of the mainstream and academe to pursue this question than one has to ask about his grounding in the debate as a whole. Asking why is certainly the most important question in the field, though figuring out how that question can and should be answered is not brought any closer into view through this work.

Mohamedou asserts that AQ is an organisation, an entity, capable of a casus belli without ever convincing us of how or what led him to that conclusion. Any author describing AQ as a cohesive body capable of control and rationale must surely defend this assertion, for the mounting evidence to the contrary. He uses the well-quoted words of Osama Bin Laden and there are some neatly drawn diagrams of the organisational structure of AQ through the years, but this is not evidence, and the attempt to extrapolate a meaning from it is problematic. In essence, Mohamedou risks being culpable of the same mistake many others make by believing the AQ myth and buying into the AQ brand before ascertaining any reality. This book does not rely on any primary research, nor does the author exhibit any unique access to AQ, which would support his assertion of AQ as an organisation worthy of analysis in this manner.


Instead, the work runs down tangents, which semi-interesting it does not contend with the books own stated goal and aim. The author goes through the motions in mentioning a number of authors in areas he is obviously interested in, like Political Philosophy, Paul Gilbert in a short paragraph on just war theory and Mary Kaldor and the New Wars distinction are given a cursory and respectful citation. But there is no in-depth engagement with their material and his stated aims.

Any author with the aim of examining AQs justification for war should not impose a justification made from secondary sources that lack a proven basis. Nor should a philosophical question about AQs motives only be the preserve of ivory tower dwelling thinkers, somewhere in the middle of both problems lies this work, which is not to say it does not contain some accurate interpretations of the current situation and does provide an interesting collage of other writings connected to AQ.

However, when Mohamedou overlooks the fact that half a decade earlier he was beaten to the task of highlighting this question of AQs meaning and Justification by Faisal Devji in “Landscapes of the Jihad,” who I would argue brought more to the table then, its hard to commend this over Devjis work.

While Devji certainly set a high watermark for thinking in this area, few writers have attempted to engage with the ideas since and this work doesn't reverse that trend. Those that have done so, and have pursued primary sourced research while taking on board the conceptual progression

put forward by Devji, are unfortunately also missing from this book.

Scott Attran's “Talking to the Enemy” and Ariel Merari's “Driven to Death” have attempted (granted with only limited success but their contribution should not be underestimated) to the question of why AQ exists and actually conducted some research. I mention these works because of their solid commitments to widen the scope of inquiry beyond the AQ examination to include those often labelled as militants, jihadis, suicide bombers and terrorists without classifying them simply as members of Al Qaeda, a single body for which no one controls or speaks for but yet for whom we are supposed to believe has a meaning and justification — stated or inferred 



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